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NEPAL’S NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nepal’s Maoists crowned their transition from under-
ground insurgency to open politics with a convincing 
victory in 10 April 2008 constituent assembly (CA) 
elections. Their surprise win has thrown other parties 
into confusion, with the major mainstream ones un-
willing to recognise their defeat and participate in a 
Maoist-led government, despite clear pre-election and 
constitutional commitments to maintaining cross-party 
unity. The CA nearly unanimously ended the monar-
chy at its first sitting and gave birth to the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Nepal. However, extended, 
unedifying haggling over government-formation sug-
gests the consensus-based approach to the constitutional 
process will be hard to implement. Building a lasting 
peace and delivering the change voters called for re-
quires all parties to accept the new situation and coop-
erate under a Maoist-led government, in particular to 
deal with issues scarcely yet addressed including the 
security sector, reestablishment of law and order in 
some districts, land and local government. 
For once, a rarity in Nepali politics, the political land-
scape has changed irrevocably. The country has man-
aged a peaceful republican transition, and the Maoists 
– the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN(M)) – and re-
gional parties are here to stay. While old-style poli-
ticking will continue, the shape of politics has been 
seriously revised. The new CA is the most inclusive 
body Nepal has ever elected, with much greater repre-
sentation of the many castes, ethnic groups and re-
gional communities than past parliaments. Women 
make up a third of the assembly, placing Nepal well 
ahead of other countries in the region. However, the 
elections produced not only a mandate for change but 
also a recipe for deadlock. 
The old parties have not woken up to the new reali-
ties. The popular mandate was not for a one-party mi-
nority administration but for cooperation on a path for 
peace and change. The Nepali Congress (NC) and 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, 
UML) went into the election with a clear commitment 
to working on the basis of consensus and cooperation 
after the polls, regardless of the outcome. Their reluc-
tance to keep that promise may be partly a bargaining 
position but risks harming the process and further re-
ducing their already low public esteem. They are in 
danger of being seen as sulking spoilers instead of con-
structive participants in a constitutional process that 
would benefit from healthy debate and different pol-
icy positions. The longer they delay internal reforms to 
make themselves more representative, the longer it will 
take to reconnect with disillusioned former supporters. 
The Maoist leadership has also not made full use of 
the opportunity to lever its position of strength inter-
nally and decisively reject the politics of violence and 
coercion. The “peaceful revolution” strategy, much 
questioned within the movement, appears to have de-
livered a greater success than even its architects ex-
pected. Still, they face internal debates and external 
pressures. They are capable of working in coalition – 
indeed, Maoist leader Prachanda has a much better 
track record of managing his own party’s internal dis-
putes through consensus than Girija Prasad Koirala of 
the NC, who announced on 26 June that he would re-
sign as prime minister. But winning trust will require 
action as well as words, starting with a demonstrated 
commitment to the rule of law and an end to the par-
allel policing functions of the Young Communist 
League (YCL). 
The security sector remains the critical problem. The 
continuing existence of two standing armies is inher-
ently destabilising. There are widespread and sensible 
concerns over a Maoist government commanding both 
the Nepal Army (NA) and its own forces. But it is the 
NA and the mainstream parties who created this situa-
tion by spending two years determinedly resisting 
every overture to discuss the future of the security sec-
tor. The national army remains outside any meaningful 
democratic control – and hence without checks and 
balances to safeguard a smooth handover of power. 
This is a legacy of ex-Prime Minister Koirala and army 
chief Rookmangad Katwal’s preference to use the 
army as a tool for personal political interest. Maoist 
willingness to discuss compromise options has met 
with an unyielding brick wall. 
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Beyond the security sector, other pressing challenges 
need to be addressed. Law and order is in tatters, par-
ticularly in some Tarai districts, and the culture of im-
punity remains intact. There has been no progress on 
the twin questions of returning land seized during the 
conflict and establishing a committee to plan prom-
ised land reforms. Securing the peace will require se-
rious attention to measures at the district and village 
level, but so far there has not even been consensus on 
reestablishing the rudiments of local government.  
In a final irony of the republican transition, ex-King 
Gyanendra’s dignified exit suggested that he under-
stood the popular mood better than the old parties. 
Every indication is that party leaders, however, have 
little respect for the supposed sovereignty of the CA 
and wish to keep all decision-making powers in a few 
hands. This bodes ill for the legitimacy of the consti-
tution-writing process. 
A companion report, published simultaneously, de-
scribes the CA campaign and vote, assesses the credi-
bility of the election and analyses the results. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Seven Governing Parties and the Other 
Major Parties Represented in the Constituent  
Assembly:  
1. Form a consensus-based government under Mao-
ist (CPN(M)) leadership, with as broad participa-
tion as possible.  
2. Resolve any remaining election disputes through 
established, and functional, formal mechanisms, 
such as the Constituent Assembly Elections Court, 
rather than by trading unsubstantiated allegations 
in public. 
3. Start discussions on the future of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepal Army 
(NA), including by: 
(a) setting up a multi-party committee, along the 
lines of the interim legislature’s defunct “146 
Committee”, to discuss the future of the secu-
rity sector; 
(b) starting a genuine national debate on Nepal’s 
security requirements and how state security 
forces should be organised to meet them – 
rather than the other way around; 
(c) beginning work on building a capable minis-
try of defence and setting up the National Se-
curity Council; and 
(d) developing plans for making the army and po-
lice more representative of Nepal’s caste, ethnic 
and regional diversity, including measures 
promised in past agreements. 
4. Set up a mechanism, such as a commission, to 
handle the twin issues of returning land seized 
during the conflict and preparing for land reform. 
5. Move forward with other remaining elements of 
the peace process, including by: 
(a) implementing the December 2007 23-point 
agreement and other accords;  
(b) abiding by the November 2006 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) and ceasefire code of 
conduct; and 
(c) paying attention to the need for local peace-
building, for example by reestablishing local 
government bodies and facilitating discus-
sions between all parties and local communi-
ties at the district level. 
6. Decide on the need for further UN assistance and 
request it as soon as possible to enable a smooth 
transition from the current mission (UNMIN), 
whose mandate expires on 22 July. 
7. Prepare for the constitution-writing process by: 
(a) establishing, with as broad a consensus as pos-
sible, permanent rules of procedure to replace 
the current temporary provisions; 
(b) forming appropriate CA subcommittees and 
agreeing on how to manage the division of busi-
ness between the CA as a constitution-drafting 
body and as a legislature; 
(c) making clear commitments for public partici-
pation, as most major parties promised in elec-
tion manifestos without spelling out details. 
8. Take immediate steps towards ending the culture 
of impunity, for example by: 
(a) completing investigations already underway 
into wartime atrocities and demanding com-
pliance from all witnesses and suspects; 
(b) investigating and prosecuting other well-
documented cases of rights violations, such as 
the torture and disappearances allegedly carried 
out by the army at Maharajgunj and the Mao-
ists’ bombing of a civilian bus at Madi; and 
(c) investigating and informing families of the 
fate of people disappeared during the conflict, 
as promised in the CPA, and ordering the co-
operation of state security agencies and the 
CPN(M) in probing the whereabouts of the 
hundreds who are still unaccounted for. 
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9. Respect and promote the role of women, not only 
the one third of CA members, in the peace process 
and strive to implement all of UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1325’s recommendations, building 
on Nepal’s new reputation as the regional leader 
in women’s political representation. 
10. Respect the pre-election deals with protesting 
groups by implementing fully the agreements with 
the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) 
and the Federal Republican National Front and 
continue to pursue negotiations with armed mili-
tant groups.  
11. Move beyond solely seven-party cooperation to 
involve all parties represented in the CA in the 
constitution-writing process, and consider revis-
ing the interim constitution to remove the special 
status accorded to the governing seven parties. 
To the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 
CPN(M): 
12. End the use of violence, intimidation and extor-
tion by: 
(a) bringing the YCL under control and ensuring 
its activities are limited to those of a legitimate, 
non-violent political party youth wing; and 
(b) cooperating with investigations into alleged 
crimes carried out by Maoist cadres (including 
the April 2008 murder of Ram Hari Shrestha) 
and surrendering suspects to the state authorities. 
13. Dismantle parallel governance structures such as 
“people’s courts”, the United Revolutionary People’s 
Council and other “people’s government” bodies. 
To the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist 
Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, 
UML): 
14. Accept the election results and use the sizeable 
number of CA seats voters did deliver construc-
tively. 
15. Recognise the need for serious structural and policy 
reform to reconnect with voters, for example by: 
(a) improving internal democracy (which is par-
ticularly weak in the NC); 
(b) making party structures at all levels more rep-
resentative of Nepal’s diversity; and 
(c) increasing progressively the level of women’s 
representation in party offices. 
To the Nepal Army: 
16. Fulfil repeated commitments to democracy by: 
(a) staying out of politics; 
(b) assisting in steps towards meaningful democ-
ratic control of the security sector; and 
(c) providing professional input to discussions on 
the shape of future national security strategy. 
To the International Community, in particular 
India, China, the U.S., EU and UN: 
17. Assist in the post-election period by: 
(a) reminding all parties they must accept the out-
come and only use formal procedures to resolve 
any outstanding complaints; and 
(b) urging and supporting the formation of a power-
sharing unity government. 
18. Offer technical and financial assistance for estab-
lishing mechanisms to ensure public participation 
in the constitutional process and work to coordi-
nate proposed training and orientation programs 
for CA members, if the CA desires such efforts. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 3 July 2008 
  
Asia Report N°156 3 July 2008 
NEPAL’S NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s constituent assembly (CA) elections deliv-
ered a surprise result and opened a difficult new tran-
sitional phase in the peace process.1 The lie of the 
land for the main parties has changed. The Commu-
nist Party of Nepal (Maoist, CPN(M)), has in the 
space of two years moved from being an underground 
insurgent group to the largest national party, com-
manding over a third of the seats in the assembly. The 
Nepali Congress (NC), which won the last general 
elections in 1999 and had dominated the interim gov-
ernment, trailed a distant second, with half the seats 
of the CPN(M). It, and the third party (the moderate 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, 
UML), face the challenge of coping with the Maoists’ 
victory, revitalising their own party structures and re-
connecting with the electorate. The strong showing by 
new regional parties from the plains, in particular the 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), is a sign of irre-
versible structural changes in political support. 
This report, the second of a set of two, surveys the 
new political landscape following the 10 April 2008 
elections.2 It first examines the situation of the parties: 
how they have reacted to the results, the state of in-
ternal debates and organisational pressures and the 
factors likely to shape their behaviour in the short to 
medium term. The latter sections examine the domes-
tic and international reactions and the challenges of 
 
 
1 On the pre-election period and the constitutional and legal 
provisions governing the elections and the transition, see 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, Nepal’s Election and Be-
yond¸ 2 April 2008. Other recent reporting includes Crisis 
Group Asia Briefing Nº72, Nepal: Peace Postponed, 18 De-
cember 2007; Asia Briefing Nº68, Nepal’s Fragile Peace 
Process, 28 September 2007; and Asia Reports N°136, Ne-
pal’s Troubled Tarai Region, 9 July 2007; N°132, Nepal’s 
Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007; and N°128, 
Nepal’s Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. Full 
Nepali translations of these reports and briefings are avail-
able at www.crisisgroup.org/nepali. 
2 The companion background report, Nepal’s Election: A 
Peaceful Revolution?, which is being published simultane-
ously, describes the campaign and vote, assesses the credibil-
ity of the election and analyses the results.  
the transition to a new government, interim state struc-
tures and the start of the constitution-writing business. 
Most of the policy recommendations offered by this 
report are not new. The immediate priority is clear: 
for all parties to accept the election results and move 
forward in sensible collaboration on the twin tasks of 
completing the peace process and writing a new con-
stitution. In these areas, many earlier recommenda-
tions remain relevant simply because so little has been 
done to address the difficult tasks essential to securing 
the peace. 
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II. THE MAOISTS: PREPARING  
FOR POWER 
The Maoist victory was at first glance a resounding 
vindication of their “peaceful revolution” strategy. 
CPN(M) Chairman Prachanda had pushed this much-
disputed leadership line while persuading his move-
ment it was worth staying in the peace process.3 How-
ever, as the Maoists themselves are most keenly aware, 
the picture is not so simple. Although the initial first-
past-the-post (FPTP) results suggested a landslide and 
outright majority, the final results left the Maoists 
with just over one third of the CA seats: enough to 
block any other parties taking control but not suffi-
cient to implement a revolutionary agenda single-
handedly – as their opponents daily remind them. 
The CPN(M) leadership faces numerous internal and 
external pressures.4 Debates within the party have not 
subsided, and in some respects have sharpened; its in-
ternational backers have been happy at the results but 
reserve judgement on their strategy. The success was 
facilitated by a massive organisation, which now ex-
pects concrete rewards. The party has yet to secure 
leadership of the transitional government, and, even 
when it does, will have to manage a coalition or mi-
nority administration while facing high expectations 
and problems so serious (not least rising food and fuel 
prices) that they would trouble the strongest majority 
regime. Finally, the election result and conciliatory 
public statements are far from enough to convince 
sceptics, domestic and international, that the Maoists 
have solid democratic credentials. They know they 
have to deal with donors and outside powers, in par-
ticular the immediate neighbours – India and China – 
 
 
3 On the revised Maoist strategy and debates over their par-
ticipation in the peace process, see Crisis Group Report, Ne-
pal’s Maoists, op. cit. 
4 For a recent assessment of the CPN(M)’s transition by a 
respected observer, see Kiyoko Ogura, “Seeking State 
Power: The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)”, Berghof 
Research Center, Berlin, 2008, at www.berghof-center. 
org/uploads/download/transitions_cpnm.pdf. In this section, 
“internal” means within the Maoist movement itself. When 
Maoist strategists speak of “internal” challenges, they often 
refer to national/domestic issues as opposed to international, 
as in this analysis: “There are two types of challenges- inter-
nal and external. Internally, despite the fall of [the] main rep-
resentative of feudalism, its political, economic, cultural 
forms, among others, are still prevalent. Moreover, we have 
yet to truly institutionalise a republic. At this period, the con-
servatives can come up with different faces. Externally, with 
the establishment of a republic, foreign reactionary forces 
will also try to intervene”. Mohan Baidya, “Kiran” interview, 
The Rising Nepal, 2 June 2008. 
towards whom they propose to adopt a policy of 
“equi-proximity”. 
A. INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
The CPN(M) is Nepal’s most disciplined and united 
party, despite perhaps also being the party most able 
to cope with lively internal debate. It has never suf-
fered major splits or defections,5 nor has Prachanda 
ever faced a serious challenge to his leadership since 
he assumed control of the CPN(M)’s forerunner, the 
CPN (Masal) in 1985.6 Throughout the tortuous peace 
process it has maintained a unified front, although its 
internal discussions have taken place more and more 
publicly. 
This report does not offer a detailed analysis of policy 
debate within the CPN(M). There are, however, three 
salient features which are sometimes lost on outside 
observers: 
 The mainstream media likes to present many dis-
putes as personality clashes. But two-dimensional 
portraits of “sulky” Matrika Yadav or “haughty” 
Mohan Baidya obscure the fact that most differ-
ences are grounded in serious policy debates, even 
if some are also tinged by individual tensions. Sen-
ior Maoists take their politics seriously; most of 
them, including top People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) commanders, are prolific writers of weighty 
ideological polemics – and occasional sharp jabs at 
those who espouse different lines.7 A simplistic 
division into “hardliners” and “softliners” is also 
unhelpful: the architects of the peace process line 
are not ideologically “soft”. 
 For all the attention Maoist leaders have given to 
transformation and moving away from armed 
struggle, the fulcrum of debate is not whether the 
 
 
5 The only high-profile Maoist to quit the movement, Rabin-
dra Shrestha, made perhaps the worst individual miscalcula-
tion of the election campaign, joining the UML with a fan-
fare of publicity just before it was crushed by the CPN(M) at 
the polls. On Shrestha’s revolt against Prachanda, see Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
6 On the history of the CPN(M)’s antecedents, see Deepak 
Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege: Ne-
pal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003 (Kathmandu, 2003). 
The falling out between Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai in 
early 2005 was serious but at no point likely to have prompted 
a major split in the movement. 
7 The most egregious spilling over of personal politics into 
the mainstream media was an article by Baburam Bhattarai’s 
assistant portraying him as a “new Pushpalal”, the most re-
spected of Nepal’s first communist leaders. Bishwadeep Pan-
dey “Baburam ‘naya pushpalal’”, Kantipur, 19 May 2008.  
Nepal’s New Political Landscape  
Crisis Group Asia Report N°156, 3 July 2008 Page 3 
 
 
CPN(M) should embrace “normal” democratic 
politics. The Maoists believe themselves already to 
be democratic and, in their view, far more so than 
other parties, but their definition of “democracy” 
is not the same as post-1990 parliamentary prac-
tice, which they (and many others) see as compro-
mised and discredited. The real debate is about 
how best to achieve their revolutionary goals: it is 
an argument about means, not ends. The ideologi-
cal gulf between the Maoists and the old parties 
remains wide.8 
 Debate is generally contained within the party, and 
once a line is agreed it is adhered to. Much has been 
made of the emergence of an anti-leadership (or at 
least anti-Baburam Bhattarai) “dissident” group, led 
by Mohan Baidya “Kiran” and Ram Bahadur Tha-
pa “Badal”. But, as with the barely concealed de-
bates at post-people’s movement central commit-
tee meetings, opponents of the Maoists would be 
rash to assume such disagreements are signs of a 
serious split. Those who have frequently predicted 
a debilitating factional falling-out are still waiting, 
and may have to wait much longer. 
The more serious internal challenges are more down-
to-earth and less tractable – the type of difficulties that 
cannot be finessed by well crafted choice of language. 
The first is organisational. The size of the Maoist 
movement has been its strength but is also a burden. 
The party core – including long-term activists and 
combatants – is not a problem. As has been demon-
strated in the past two years, the military, the PLA, is 
firmly under party control and has, in general, quietly 
put up with the frustrations of cantonment life with no 
exit in sight. The Young Communist League (YCL) is 
a different question. It has well-trained (mainly ex-
PLA) commanders but has grown exponentially.9 As 
 
 
8 CPN(M) Central Committee member Dharmendra Bastola 
warned that their opponents are deliberately obstructing the 
“New Democratic Revolution”: “The parliamentary parties 
want to keep semi-feudal, semi-colonial mode of production 
at any cost. Our Party has been struggling to smash them”. 
Interview, The Red Star, 1 June 2008, at http://southasiarev. 
wordpress.com/2008/06/08/bastola-interview-achievements-
gained-thru-peoples-war. 
9 There are no accurate figures on the strength of the YCL, 
although informed estimates suggest it could be as high as 
300,000-400,000 (not all of these being full-time activists). 
Maoist leaders have said they want to boost its membership 
to one million, but even the YCL’s chief is unwilling to talk 
exact figures, as this interview illustrates: “Q: You say you 
have one million active cadres working in your organisation. 
How do you manage such a large number of people? Pun: 
All one million of them are not the full-timers. Q: How many 
of them work full-time? Pun: They are very few in number, 
the Maoists know from their rapid expansion into the 
east during the insurgency, mass recruitment brings 
many problems. The core of the YCL was former 
“people’s militia” youths; more recent recruits have 
not even their basic level of selection, training and 
testing. The Maoists want and need the YCL but can-
not sustain it by legitimate means; they can improve 
its disciplinary record but only if they want to and de-
vote significant energy to the task. So far, efforts have 
been unconvincing.10 
The second is about practical politics. Assuming the 
CPN(M) does end up leading the next government – 
despite other parties’ qualms and internal doubts – it 
will have to fight on several fronts as it tries to de-
liver. Apart from pushing its constitutional vision, it 
will need to cope with all the woes that face incum-
bent administrations in difficult times, exacerbated by 
its ambitious manifesto pledges.11 Succeeding in this 
challenge requires not only working with other parties 
but also through a bureaucracy that is innately con-
servative, unrepresentative and, as Maoist ministers 
belatedly realised in the course of 2007, unlikely to 
over-exert itself to implement Maoist policy. 
If Maoist leaders are not successful on both these fronts, 
the possibility of a return to street agitation cannot  
be ruled out. Speaking in Gorkha on 1 June 2008, 
Prachanda warned that obstruction in government for-
mation could lead the Maoists to launch new agitation. 
Others have again raised the prospect of an “October 
Revolution”.12 Asked if another movement or struggle 
is likely, a Maoist leader explained that the question is 
about handing power to the people, not the CPN(M): 
 
 
maybe 5 or 10 per cent. Q: That means around 20,000 per-
sons? Pun: Even less than that. We don’t have the exact data. 
That one million is also not the precise figure. There were 
around six to seven lakh [600-700,000] YCL cadres some 
seven months ago. We expanded the organization’s member-
ship during the election, so now the number may be around 
nine to 10 lakhs [900,000-1 million]”. “The polls succeeded 
because we became Gandhis”, interview with YCL leader 
Ganesh Man Pun, The Kathmandu Post, 16 June 2008. 
10 “YCL to stop taking action against others”, The Kathman-
du Post, 31 May 2008. The YCL’s chief commented: “We 
are not a paramilitary institution; we may appear paramili-
tary in our action and manner because we work and move in 
a mass or group. We will correct that, and we have been say-
ing it”. Ibid. 
11 The CPN(M)’s election “Commitment Paper” made many 
specific promises – for example, universal drinking water, 
health care and education – as did a separate economic vi-
sion paper. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and 
Beyond, op. cit., p. 3. 
12 See also Somat Ghimire, “Badhyakari bandaichha aktobar 
kranti”, Naya Patrika, 5 June 2008. 
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The role of our party is to lead these people to 
seize the political power, if [it is] not handed over 
through the level of struggle so far performed. 
And, if the NC and the UML fail to comply to the 
people’s verdict, the people will certainly come to 
the struggle of another level and force them to 
hand over the political power to the people. No 
force in the world can stop the people from taking 
power, once they get ideologically, politically 
equipped. This will be the case in Nepal too.13  
B. EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
The Maoists are also well aware that they need to deal 
with the international community – both as political 
power centres and/or donors – and sceptical potential 
allies such as the business community and media. 
Maoist leaders’ immediate reactions to their victory 
were overwhelmingly conciliatory and accommodating. 
With some notable exceptions – such as Prachanda’s 
intemperate, albeit ironic, attack on one private media 
house14 – party representatives at most levels have been 
carefully on-message. The tone was set by Prachanda 
himself at his first public speech as the election re-
sults came in: 
We will work together with not only the seven par-
ties but also the new parties that will be established 
through this election and the old parties in existence 
in the forthcoming constitution making proc-
ess.…All eyes are upon us. This is a positive chal-
lenge for us. I want to clarify that the path of co-
operation that we adopted since the twelve-point 
agreement will continue....For the international 
community and especially our neighbours India 
and China, I want to say that our party wants good 
relations with all of them and is willing to work 




13 Interview, The Red Star, op. cit. 
14 “Prachanda warns Kantipur Publications”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 31 May 2008. Kantipur had taken a stridently anti-Maoist 
stance, in particular since the Maoist-affiliated trade union 
organised its paper delivery men and vandalised its printing 
presses in a protest over workers’ rights. Prachanda’s “threat” 
prompted outraged condemnations from Kantipur, the Fed-
eration of Nepalese Journalists and international press free-
dom watchdogs. However, journalists who attended the 
meeting which Prachanda addressed said it was clear he was 
speaking ironically – prefacing his warning with thanks for 
Kantipur’s “help” to the Maoist campaign. Crisis Group in-
terviews, journalists, Kathmandu, 9 and 18 June 2008. 
15 “‘We want to continue working with parties and the int’l 
community’, says Prachanda”, nepalnews.com, 12 April 2008. 
Maoist leaders kept up their efforts to court the inter-
national community, most notably appearing at a UN-
hosted press conference following a meeting with do-
nors on 24 April. They have made some concrete pro-
gress, for example engaging U.S. diplomats face-to- 
face.16 Maoist representatives at an Indo-Nepal semi-
nar in Patna were well received. A sceptical journalist 
at the meeting was won over by Minister Hisila Yami’s 
performance: “For the first time I wasn’t embarrassed 
by our minister. She said all the right things, in form 
and content. It was truly impressive”.17 The Maoists 
know they need international cooperation and have a 
simple message to communicate to the world: “All we 
want is for outsiders to give us a fair chance. Let them 
criticise us if we make mistakes but the time for preju-
dice is over. We want to deliver real change and hope 
international friends will work with us”.18 
Before and after the elections, the CPN(M) maintained 
a controversial push to encourage former royalist 
“nationalists” to join hands with them. Some, such as 
Panchayat-era zonal commissioner Surya Bahadur Sen 
Oli, were even accommodated on the party’s PR list. 
Plausible rumours abound that other high-profile mon-
archists, such as royal foreign minister Ramesh Nath Pan-
dey, have been wooed.19 Reports even suggested the 
CPN(M) wanted the king himself to join a new Mao-
ist-led nationalist front.20 Many who formerly looked 
to the palace and despised the Maoists are in confu-
sion. They are naturally attracted to the CPN(M)’s 
promise of nationalist governance with an authoritarian 
firm hand, and delighted at the defeat of mainstream 
party leaders they had long derided but been unable to 
unseat. At the same time, they are deeply suspicious 
of communism. The Maoists are unlikely to find more 
than conditional support among former royalists. 
But the most visible diplomatic target has been the 
business community. As a useful analysis points out, 
apart from political negotiations, top Maoist leaders 
have lavished most time and attention on the private 
sector.21 Prachanda’s and Bhattarai’s well-publicised 
talk with the newly elected Federation of Nepalese 
 
 
16 See below, Section IV.C(2). 
17 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 28 April 2008. 
18 Crisis Group interview, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Kath-
mandu, 17 April 2008. 
19 A weekly quoted reports that the Maoists were preparing 
to propose Pandey for the CA. “Nepal: Staunch royalist Pan-
dey in Maoist quota for CA member”, Telegraph Weekly, 19 
May 2008, at www.telegraphnepal.com/news_det.php? 
news_ id=3447. 
20 “Prachanda wants ex-king to join nationalist front with 
Maoists”, Press Trust of India, 9 June 2008. 
21 Mukul Humagain and Rishikesh Dahal, “Najukindai neta”, 
Nepal, 15 June 2008. 
Nepal’s New Political Landscape  
Crisis Group Asia Report N°156, 3 July 2008 Page 5 
 
 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) presi-
dent was their first high-profile, post-election meet-
ing.22 Many more have followed. 
C. POLICY, IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM 
“Nepal’s Maoists have changed their strategy and tac-
tics but not yet their goals”, was how Crisis Group as-
sessed the CPN(M)’s position in early 2007.23 This 
remains a valid, if simplistic, summary. Although 
several CPN(M) leaders complained of anti-Maoist 
“bias” in that report, they are keen to reinforce the 
central message that their revolution continues. Hints 
that the party may abandon its “Prachandapath” strat-
egy and even drop “Maoist” in a rebranding exercise 
seem premature.24 As Prachanda explained on the eve 
of the elections, “we have not completed the democ-
ratic revolution, you know. We are in the process of 
the completion of the democratic revolution”.25 The 
Maoists emphasise that their current situation is the 
result of bullet and ballot, not a rejection of the for-
mer. “We have not left the armed struggle”, insisted 
Baburam Bhattarai. “We wouldn’t be here without the 
armed struggle – if we did not have an army. It’s a fu-
sion of bullet and ballot”.26 Leaders consistently point 
 
 
22 The FNCCI subsequently came up with its own twenty-
year economic vision paper, echoing themes stressed by the 
Maoists but also emphasising the leading role of a fully in-
dependent private sector. 
23 Crisis Group Report Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit., p. i. 
24 Narayankaji Shrestha “Prakash”, general secretary of CPN 
(Unity Center-Masal), announced that his party would soon 
merge with the CPN(M), which would drop Prachandapath and 
even the “Maoist” name. “Maoists will abandon Prachanda-
path, says Prakash”, nepalnews.com, 9 June 2008. For an in-
depth interview see “Videshi Kutnitigyaharu aphnai mary-
adama basun”, Ghatana ra Bichar, 18 June 2008. 
25 Mary Des Chene and Stephen Mikesell, “An Exclusive In-
terview for MRZine with CPN(Maoist) Leader Prachanda”, 
Monthly Review, 27 May 2008, at http://mrzine.monthlyreview. 
org/prachanda270508p.html. 
26 Amit Sengupta, “It’s a fusion of bullet and ballot”, Hard 
News, June 2008, at www.hardnewsmedia.com/2008/ 
06/2210. When a transcript of an Indian television interview 
with Prachanda appeared to airbrush out the “bullet” ele-
ment, Indian supporters of the CPN(M) reacted angrily to 
this “doctoring, nay censoring” of Prachanda’s original ref-
erence to the “fusion” of bullet and ballot. Anand Swaroop 
Verma and Gautam Navlakha (on behalf of Indo-Nepal Peo-
ple’s Solidarity Forum), letter to Karan Thapar, New Delhi, 
19 May 2008. For a good exposition of Bhattarai’s thinking, 
see Stephen Mikesell and Mary Des Chene, “Baburam Bhat-
tarai: For a ‘New Nepal’”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
10 May 2008. 
out that the end of the monarchy alone does not mean 
the struggle against feudalism is over.27 
Leveraging their partial victory and justifying the revo-
lutionary credentials of the ballot/bullet fusion will, 
however, present significant political and ideological 
challenges. As their Indian counterparts put it: “The 
real test, however, begins now after the CPN(M) takes 
over the reins of power. It is a fundamental tenet of 
Marxism that no radical restructuring of the system is 
possible without the smashing of the existing state”.28 
The CPI(Maoist) warned that mass mobilisation will 
continue to be the only way to force the former ruling 
classes to give up power and that the CPN(M)’s lack 
of a CA majority means they will not be able to win 
the “arduous and bitter struggle” to write a pro-poor 
constitution. They will have to choose between mak-
ing unprincipled compromises or opting to “intensify 
the struggle through all means, including armed insur-
rection, in order to implement genuine democracy and 
establish people’s power. There is no other alterna-
tive”. Or rather, the alternative is “to become dizzy 
with success” and invite a “reactionary backlash”.29 
The CPI(Maoist) concluded that the CPN(M) would 
be better off not joining government and continuing 
to lead a mass struggle from outside. The result of 
working with “reactionary parties and imperialists” 
would be “degeneration of the party leadership and 
cadres and emergence of a strong bureaucratic class. 
In such a scenario, all the gains made would go down 
the drain, and the reactionary parties would once 
again come to power by cashing in on the frustration 
of the masses”.30 This is a far from private debate: the 
mainstream Nepali press has relayed the message to 
stay out of government.31 
Such a critique is far from an extreme position on the 
left. It was the inflexible rule of India’s moderate 
CPI(Marxist), which refused to allow its leader, Jyoti 
Basu, to head a coalition administration in 1997 and 
is only supporting India’s governing UPA coalition 
from outside government. The fears of the CPN(M) 
being weakened by being in office but not in power 
echo the long-standing critique of the UML’s decision 
to lead a minority administration in 1994, a choice 
 
 
27 See, for example, Hisila Yami, “Dhalyo rajtantra, dhaleko 
chhaina samantavad”, Gorkhapatra, 18 June 2008. 
28 Azad, spokesperson, Central Committee, CPI (Maoist), Press 





31 “Bharatiya maovadidvara pushpakamallai sattama nabasna 
agrah”, Kantipur, 11 June. 
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many of its leaders later came to regret – though per-
haps not as many as now regret its joining the 2004-
2005 Deuba coalition as a junior partner. But the 
Maoists have already experienced being in power but 
not in office and realise the need to get their hands on 
the levers of the state. As the Leninist streak in their 
thinking has long suggested, there is little to be 
gained by dominating the countryside while being 
locked out of central power. 
The CPN(M)’s successes have for years discomfited 
international Maoists as much as they have cheered 
them. Few fraternal organisations, least of all senior 
Indian Maoists, gave the CPN(M) good odds on pro-
gress when they launched their “people’s war”; many 
were happy to criticise them as inexperienced and un-
realistic.32 At the same time, some thinkers within the 
Maoist Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) 
who have been urging fresh thinking have seized on 
the CPN(M)’s changed approach as evidence in sup-
port of their challenge to old orthodoxies. As an Ameri-
can activist who has strongly criticised the American 
Revolutionary Communist Party leader Bob Avakian’s 
line put it: 
The [CPN(M)’s] mix of communist goals and non-
dogmatic methods disturb a lot of leftist assump-
tions too. When the CPN(Maoist) launched an 
armed uprising in 1996, some people thought these 
were outdated tactics. When the CPN(Maoist) sus-
pended armed combat in 2006 and entered an anti-
monarchist coalition government, some people as-
sumed they would lose their identity to a corrupt 
cabal. When the Maoists press their current anti-
feudal program, some people think they are forget-
ting about socialism.33 
This is a debate that will run and run, within the 
CPN(M) and the global radical left alike.34 The im-
portant point is that the CPN(M) leadership’s line has 
been bold and controversial and will remain so. Its 
“transformation” is not insincere but it is not set in 
stone, nor will supporters accept it unconditionally. If 
it delivers results – progress towards the Maoists’ clearly 
stated goals – it will be hailed as a success. If it ap-
pears to falter, the voices urging a revised approach 
will be strengthened. 
 
 
32 For background on the CPN(M)’s close but disputatious 
relations with other Maoist organisations, see Crisis Group 
Report Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit., pp. 8-12. 
33 Mike Ely, “Eyes on the Maobadi: 4 Reasons Nepal’s Revolu-
tion Matters”, 8 June 2008, at http://southasiarev.wordpress. 
com/2008/06/08/eyes-on-the-maobadi-4-reasons-nepal%e2% 
80%99s-revolution-matters/. 
34 Crisis Group will return to the topic of post-election Mao-
ist politics in more detail in future reporting. 
D. STRENGTHS AND STRAINS 
The Maoists have emphatically demonstrated their 
political and organisational strengths. Given their re-
silience and adaptability and the parlous state of their 
main opponents, sensible money should now be on a 
repeat performance in the next election, whenever it 
comes. The main threat to a further victory is either a 
dramatic (but unlikely) revival of the NC and UML’s 
fortunes or (unlikely, but not impossible) serious fail-
ure in government or eruption of internal divisions. 
However, their strengths bring with them weaknesses. 
All their courting of critics will go in vain if they can-
not transform their actions as well as their words. 
Continuing bad behaviour is not limited to isolated 
aberrations but still reflects a systemic unwillingness 
to respect fully the democratic norms they have sup-
posedly signed up to.  
The post-election abduction, torture and killing of 
Kathmandu businessman Ram Hari Shrestha is only 
the most egregious example. It appears to have been 
carried out under the direct supervision of senior PLA 
commanders. While Maoist leaders eventually accep-
ted responsibility and offered compensation, they have 
not allowed justice to take its course, nor have they 
handed over the prime accused.35 There have been 
credible reports of reprisals against individuals and 
communities who did not vote for them.36 On 18 May 
the National Human Rights Commission published 
ten specific allegations of serious rights violations.37 
 
 
35 PLA Deputy Commander Prabhakar announced the sus-
pension of the prime accused, Kali Bahadur Kham Magar 
“Vividh” and promised that the party’s own investigation 
committee would uncover the “true facts” about Shrestha’s 
death. He made no mention of cooperating with the police, 
handing over the accused or taking action against anyone 
found responsible. Press release, PLA Deputy Headquarters, 
23 May 2008. 
36 For example, various media reported that Maoists had cut 
off water supplies to Bagarkot, Dadeldhura, because locals 
had not voted for them. “Bhot nadieko bhandai pani mu-
hanma avarodh”, Kantipur, 11 June 2008. 
37 On 18 May 2008, the NHRC listed ten recent allegations it 
had received about Maoist behaviour: the murder of Ram 
Hari Shrestha after abduction; the serious beating and injur-
ing at Kulung, Bhojpur of UML cadres Ram Singh Rai, 
Khagendra Kumar Rai, Dedraj Basnet and Kul Bahadur Rai 
at Kulung Bhojpur, who are being treated at TU Teaching 
Hospital in Kathmandu; destruction of the house of Chandra 
Bahadur Shrestha of Okharpauwa, Nuwakot, after he was 
accused of not voting for the Maoists and being active 
against them; the beating up and injuring of Rameshwor 
Pokharel, a teacher of Nepane Secondary School in Gorkha 
for not voting for the Maoists; disruption of the drinking wa-
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Days later, the NC accused the YCL of murdering 
party worker Jaya Lal Bom in Kalikot district on 16 
May.38 Maoist leaders have, quite reasonably, asked 
to be judged by their actions. By this measure, they 
still have much to answer for. 
 
 
ter supply by cutting pipes in Nawalpur-8, Sindhupalchowk, 
after accusing villagers of not voting for the Maoists and not 
donating money for a road construction project; YCL death 
threats, which forced the five-member family of Nara Ba-
hadur Gurung to flee their home in Changthapu VDC, 
Panchthar district; the merciless beating of five brothers of a 
family at Kaskikot, Kaski district; the manhandling of Ram 
Banjare, the owner of Gulmeli Hotel in Arghakhanchi; the 
threatening of Pratap Singh Tamang of Hokse VDC, Kavre 
district, for voting for the NC; the beating up of teachers 
Krishna Prasad Pathak and Ram Nath Tiwari of Rameshwor 
Higher Secondary School in Chitwan. 
38 “NC alleges Maoists of killing its cadre in Kalikot”, nepal-
news.com, 21 May 2008. 
III. THE NEW OPPOSITION 
A. THE GRAND OLD PARTIES:  
IN A HOLE AND DIGGING DEEPER 
The two major mainstream parties, the NC and UML, 
are at a more critical juncture than their leaders’ public 
pronouncements suggest. Unwilling to listen to vot-
ers and their own grass-roots workers, they risk years 
in the political wilderness if they do not face up to 
their defeat and take urgent steps to reform them-
selves and reconnect with the electorate. Most signs 
suggest the NC will prefer to turn inwards, rejecting 
the election’s message and becoming embroiled in in-
ternal strife. The UML is more disciplined and realis-
tic but has to decide whether to fight the Maoists for 
dominance of the left or rebrand itself as a centrist so-
cial democratic alternative. The established parties’ 
sense of entitlement is not wholly illusory: they were 
not wiped out at the polls and will not disappear en-
tirely. But their behaviour suggests they may lose 
themselves in self-defeating recriminations. 
For the NC and UML the election results were both 
better and worse than they appeared at first glance. 
Better, in that the initial Maoist landslide in the FPTP 
vote was balanced by a less commanding victory in the 
PR contest. Worse, in that the results from winnable 
seats suggest a crippling disconnect with ordinary 
voters and their own core supporters and activists. 
Both parties continued to pay more attention to pleas-
ing powerful outside forces than to ordinary citizens. 
They were stuck in the mode of assuming that power 
comes from above – delivered by the palace, by Delhi 
or by closed-door leadership haggling – rather than 
from the ballot box. Neither party made any visible 
effort to make itself more inclusive and representa-
tive, nor to confront the heavy ranks of established sen-
ior leaders with the need to give way to fresh faces. 
It is not very clear what the parties believe in. The 
NC’s much-trumpeted commitment to political plural-
ism is not an exclusive claim and looks increasingly 
tired in the face of its egregious refusal to develop any 
democratic practice within the party. Like the NC, the 
UML reluctantly signed up to the Maoist-led republi-
can agenda but neither wholeheartedly enough to 
suggest a genuine progressive zeal nor with enough 
concrete caveats to suggest a viable alternative stance 
on key issues. The parties may not quite deserve the 
CPI(Maoist)’s accusation that they are “narrow self-
seeking robber gangsters who are out to fatten them-
selves at the expense of the vast masses of poor and 
the destitute”, but they should seriously consider its 
conclusion, that “the results are a telling indictment 
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against forces which had proved themselves to be a 
party to the oppression, suppression and exploitation 
of women, Dalits, national minorities and adivasis 
[indigenous peoples]”.39 
1. The Nepali Congress 
The NC is well positioned to continue its dramatic de-
cline, especially if it neglects its remaining strengths. 
The party was, and remains, reunited in name only. 
There is still a well defined split between the erst-
while mother party and Sher Bahadur Deuba’s Nepali 
Congress (Democratic, NC(D)). Ex-Prime Minister 
Koirala is even reported to have blamed the NC’s 
election defeat on the “blunder” of reunifying the 
party.40 It suffered further debilitating rifts in the run-
up to the polls, most notably between those who re-
spected the decision to adopt a republican line and 
those who noisily rejected it. Among the latter was 
the then-prime minister’s daughter. Parachuted in to 
the interim legislature as a nominated member, she 
devoted much of her electoral campaign (against the 
MJF) to pursuing a personal vendetta with Home 
Minister Sitaula and publicly distancing herself from 
party policy.41 
The party’s reluctant and largely insincere conversion 
to the Maoist agenda left it unable to give a convin-
cing impression that it stood for anything other than 
its age-old commitment to multi-party politics, which 
it resolutely refused to reflect in its own practice. As 
supporters of the king never tired to point out, with 
some justification, far more Nepalis were killed under 
Deuba’s premierships than under the king’s direct 
rule. Many voters remembered that brutal police ac-
tions directed by the NC (such as 1995’s Operation 
Romeo) helped fan the flames of resentment in the mid-
west and hasten the launch of the Maoist “people’s 
war”. Hardline former home ministers Khum Bahadur 
Khadka and Govinda Raj Joshi may owe their defeats 
in part to this record. Depending on the performance 
of the MJF and others, the party could be permanently 
weakened in its Tarai base. 
The NC needs to come to terms with its defeat and 
work out how to reshape itself, but reformist voices 
are notable for their absence throughout the leadership. 
The liberal republican Narahari Acharya is a party of 
one; more radical student leaders such as Gagan 
 
 
39 Azad, spokesperson, op. cit. 
40 “Parti ekikaran ‘blandar’ thiyo”, Naya Patrika, 18 June 2008. 
41 Sujata Koirala reportedly announced she had not handed 
out a single copy of the NC manifesto in her constituency, as 
it had not been formally endorsed by the party. “NC meet put 
off yet again”, The Himalayan Times, 29 April 2008. 
Thapa have been sidelined by the leadership. There 
are no hints of the kind of internal debate that could 
prompt renewal. Most influential activists seem more 
likely, so far, to blame their defeat on their weakness in 
cooperating with the Maoists and to push for return to 
the old, conservative stance. The party youth are al-
most equally intransigent. Both the student wing (the 
NSU) and youth wing (the Tarun Dal) urged the 
prime minister to stay in place and not concede de-
feat.42 Their tough talk of forming a “Tarun Sena” to 
fight the YCL would not work (they lack the mobili-
sation capacity and are in no position to fight the 
Maoists on their terms) and would only sacrifice their 
supposed principles of non-violence and democracy – 
a self-defeating move. 
The NC has one great natural advantage: its position 
as the clear opposition to the leftist majority. In its 
own way, it also – like the Maoists – has a solid support 
base of class and economic interest groups. Whatever 
its policy flip-flops and ideological weakness, it is very 
unlikely to disappear, as it is the natural home for 
those who feel threatened by left-wing policies. With 
the poor performance of other rightist parties, all of 
which were tainted by their perceived royalism, the 
NC can cement a more solid grip on this sector of the 
electorate. Still, this will not broaden its appeal beyond 
a core base which will never in itself be sufficient to 
bring it back into government except in coalition (es-
pecially if future elections retain a PR element). The 
viability of working in coalition will depend on two 
factors: where the UML decides to position itself 
(ideologically and tactically) and whether the NC can 
reconcile itself with the new Madhesi forces that have 
eaten into its former base in the Tarai. 
In the immediate future, the NC is unlikely to devote 
much attention to longer-term strategy. Its more 
pressing problem is that it desperately needs to be in 
government, however distasteful it may find playing 
second fiddle in a Maoist-led administration. It is a 
natural party of government and has little raison d’être 
in opposition. Occupying positions of power has be-
come its primary goal and its principal sustenance: 
without the patronage power it has become accus-
tomed to, it will find it even harder to motivate its ac-
tivists and protect its grip on state institutions such as 
the bureaucracy and police. 
 
 
42 “Base political consensus on NC’s preconditions, says stu-
dent group”, ekantipur.com, 26 May 2008; “Tarun Dal sug-
gests PM to stay put unless conditions met”, nepalnews. 
com, 2 June 2008. 
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2. The UML 
The UML is trapped between the legacy of its past 
bad choices and a future that demands a boldness it 
currently lacks. Many traditional, educated urban UML 
voters told Crisis Group that they had switched to the 
Maoists because it was no longer a “real” communist 
party. This is partly a hangover from the party having 
petitioned the king for the prime ministership and 
then joined the Deuba coalition government. It also 
reflects a broader sense that the UML has seriously 
neglected its natural constituencies, such as urban 
workers and unemployed and the rural poor, and 
driven them into the Maoists’ arms. 
The UML is in many ways better placed to address its 
failings, however, than the NC. It is more internally 
democratic, better at encouraging serious internal de-
bate and has more dedicated local organisers. Although 
its attempt to withdraw its ministers from government 
as soon as the election results went bad looked like 
petulance, General Secretary Madhav Nepal’s resig-
nation as party chief to take responsibility for the de-
feat appeared graceful and principled.43 The UML then 
managed a prompt, smooth and democratic transfer of 
power to a new leadership under Jhalanath Khanal – a 
sign of party maturity the NC could never dream of. 
(Not only is NC President Koirala incapable of con-
templating resignation, he also refused to accept the 
resignation of acting President Sushil Koirala – his 
nephew.) 
The UML does have to work out how to win back 
cadres who have defected to the Maoists, but its major 
problems are not internal. Rather, it faces invidious 
choices related to its ideological positioning vis-à-vis 
the CPN(M). Both parties are fighting for at least 
some of the same political space and voters. Under its 
new leadership, the UML has taken a more aggres-
sively anti-Maoist stance,44 with General Secretary 
Khanal instructing its members to stand up to the 
Maoists in the CA and its youth wing announcing the 
formation of a new nationwide force “to provide secu-
rity to the youth, ordinary citizen and other communi-
ties who need protection from violent activities”.45 
 
 
43 Madhav Nepal has distinguished himself among the big 
losers by limiting his public comments to modest and con-
structive suggestions. See, for example, “No one can turn 
back rapid change, says Madhav Nepal”, ekantipur.com, 12 
June 2008. 
44 General Secretary Khanal ordered his party to retaliate 
immediately to any attacks. “Ailagnemathi tatkal jailagnus”, 
Budhabar, 18 June 2006. 
45 “CPN-UML to stand up to Maoists in CA”, The Kath-
mandu Post, 5 June 2008. 
The collapse of the UML’s attempt to assert its domi-
nance on the left has left it with few immediate op-
tions.46 Bamdev Gautam does not always speak for 
the party mainstream, but his argument that it should 
oppose Maoist extremism without allowing itself to 
be forced to the right reflects an instinctive UML 
view.47 However, his assessment that the UML should 
not view the challenge as one of polarisation – greater 
policy differentiation from the CPN(M) – but of 
standing ground and sticking to principles may not 
translate into electoral recovery. The UML has long 
been a social democratic party in all but name (and 
some of the rituals of communist-style organisation). 
It may yet be that a more viable future would await it 
if it rebranded itself. But the psychological leap this 
would require is unlikely in the near term. 
3. Can they reform and recover? 
There is plenty of potential for the major parties to 
rejuvenate themselves, reconnect with voters and re-
turn strongly at the next election, but only if they are 
willing to heed the message for change. If not, they 
could rule themselves out of contention for power for 
many years to come, following in the well trodden 
steps of other grand old parties that have spent a dec-
ade or more in the wilderness before pulling them-
selves together – from India’s Congress to both of the 
UK’s main parties and the French Socialists. Nepal’s 
voters have long demonstrated a desire for change, 
but the two-party dominance made this look decep-
tively like short-term, anti-incumbent sentiment rather 
than a wish for more radical transformation. 
But meaningful reform does not depend solely on 
grand policy decisions. Much of it is nuts and bolts. 
Internal party democracy and better discipline could 
reduce the trend, most sharply evident in the NC, to-
wards internecine strife. More attention to involving 
local activists in party decisions could start to rebuild 
local structures. Making parties more representative 
should not mean doing the bare minimum mandated 
by new quotas forced on them by more progressive 
opponents. Both main parties could take many small 
steps towards these goals at their own initiative, even 
if bigger ideological decisions will take time. The re-
 
 
46 Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai’s harsh assessment of the 
UML’s prospects may be subjective but deserves conside-
ration: “There will be only two major political parties in Ne-
pal – Nepali Congress, leading the bourgeois and wealthy peo-
ple on the one hand, and the Maoists, leading the progressive 
and poor people. UML holds neither the characteristics of 
poor nor the rich”. “We will lead next govt: Dr Bhattarai”, 
ekantipur.com, 13 April 2008. 
47 “Itihasko kasima emale”, Kantipur, 6 June 2008. 
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sults were embarrassing to both parties but could yet 
serve as a last wake-up call – if leaders accept the 
need to reform to win back voters’ trust. 
The international community could also help, but 
only if major players recognise their partial culpabil-
ity for the state of the parties. Outside powers spent 
years pushing the NC and UML to bow to the king 
and cautioning them off the “radical” Maoist agenda, 
thus encouraging them to isolate themselves from the 
electorate. This shielded them from the imperative to 
develop responsive policies and enhanced their natu-
ral tendency to pay more attention to higher powers 
(the king and powerful internationals, as well as the 
army, to which they were in hock from the moment it 
was mobilised) than to the citizens they had once been 
elected to represent. As past elections and the pros-
pect of future ones grew more distant, it is not surpris-
ing that ordinary people’s aspirations took second 
place to the immediate concerns of power politics. 
Rejuvenated mainstream parties would benefit the 
country immensely – both to play a critical but con-
structive role in the constitutional process and to offer 
real competition and choice at the next election. Even 
the Maoists have said repeatedly that truly competi-
tive politics is essential to avoid stagnation and cor-
ruption. A substantial majority of people did not vote 
Maoist and would presumably be keen to vote for 
other parties reflecting their concerns. If the main-
stream parties fail to live up to popular expectations, 
it will be a disservice to such voters and may well tempt 
more of them into the arms of the CPN(M), especially 
if it proves its democratic credentials, or other parties 
such as the MJF. 
B. THE ARRIVAL OF THE MADHESI PARTIES 
The Madhesi parties have arrived and are here to stay, 
although it is too early to make confident predictions 
of their future configuration. The MJF certainly made 
the most of its head-start, but the TMDP and Sadb-
havana Party cannot be ruled out of stronger conten-
tion over time. In any case, the current formation 
looks like only the first round of the battle for repre-
sentation. Dalits, Muslims and Tarai minorities have 
yet to form or find parties to promote their interests 
(although the CPN(M) has started the process). The 
experience of neighbouring Indian states suggests that 
further flux is almost inevitable. 
The MJF’s refusal to support a broad alliance may 
have harmed the overall Madhesi tally but did not hurt 
the cause as badly as many analysts had expected. It 
may also have given a boost to productive competi-
tion. The relatively poor performance of the TMDP, 
widely perceived as Delhi’s pet project, may also 
have sent a healthy signal that India cannot have its 
own way even in the areas it feels are most pliable. In 
any case, the message to the old parties is unambigu-
ous: the days when they could expect passive support 
without payback are over. The Madhesi wave has also 
helped open the territory for other ethnic and regional 
groups to pursue their agendas. Identity politics are 
unlikely to go away. 
Following a 1 June central committee meeting, the 
MJF reiterated its principal demand of an autonomous 
single Madhes province. It also proposed a strong ex-
ecutive president elected on the basis of multi-party 
competition and directly elected provincial chief min-
isters, and stressed its long-standing demand for col-
lective entry of Madhesis into the army, police, and 
all government bodies on the basis of their proportion 
of the total population.48 Other Madhesi parties are 
likely to support all these policies.49 
Shorter term developments may hinge on how much 
the MJF can make of its potential kingmaker role. It 
could be sidelined, but where larger parties are divided, 
its votes could make a crucial difference – no wonder 
it was quick to float the idea of a simple majority vote 
for government formation, which would greatly add 
to its leverage. Even without that, it has enough CA 
delegates to wield some clout and has an irresistible 
moral claim to representation in government. It also 
offers the strongest argument for ending in practice, 
and perhaps also in the text of the interim constitu-
tion, the governing seven-party coalition’s exclusive 
ownership of constitutionally defined “consensus”.50 
 
 
48 “MPRF for autonomous province”, The Rising Nepal, 4 
June 2008. 
49 On the TMDP and MJF’s post-election outlook, see ‘“Keep 
out of Tarai affairs’, Interview with Hridayesh Tripathi, 
TMDP”, The Kathmandu Post, 9 June 2008; and “‘Nothing 
except one Madhes’, Interview with Jaya Prakash Gupta, 
MJF”, The Kathmandu Post, 9 June 2008. 
50 In this report, the term “seven parties” refers to the govern-
ing coalition of six parliamentary parties and the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist, CPN(M)). The “six parties” are the 
continuation of the Seven-Party Alliance, whose member-
ship was reduced when the Nepali Congress and Nepali 
Congress (Democratic) reunited. Past Crisis Group reporting 
referred to this alliance as the SPA, a term that is now widely 
used to refer to the six plus the CPN(M) – although there is 
no “alliance” binding them. The six parties are the Nepali 
Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marx-
ist-Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi, 
NSP(A)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Workers and Peasants 
Party (NWPP); and United Left Front (ULF). 
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C. CHANGES AT THE FRINGES 
The crushing defeat of the royalist parties, which 
failed to win a single FPTP seat between them, was 
underlined by the easy overthrow of top leaders such 
as Pashupati Shamsher Rana (RPP), Surya Bahadur 
Thapa (RJP) and Kamal Thapa (RPP(Nepal)).51 In 
fact, the “royalists” were almost all quick to abandon 
the king to his fate. Despite manifesto calls for the 
people to have a “direct” say in the future of the mon-
archy,52 the RPP and RJP both voted for the republic 
proposal at the CA’s first sitting. Only the RPP (Ne-
pal) maintained the courage of its convictions and voted 
against, registering a note of dissent. But even it has 
started having second thoughts, with strong criticism 
of Kamal Thapa and calls for a rethink of the main 
platform at its post-republic central committee meet-
ing.53 “RPP-N is a democratic party”, explained Chandra 
Bahadur Gurung, who has voiced its dissent in the 
CA. “It will respect the people’s verdict.…It is neces-
sary for us to move forward by accepting the republic”.54 
With 25 parties represented in the CA, there is more 
political diversity than ever, but it remains to be seen 
how that will affect the well-worn patterns of national 
politics. The thirteen larger parties quickly organised 
themselves into a grouping,55 leaving the twelve smaller 
parties to form a similar caucus to challenge their 
dominance.56 Among the smaller parties, two features 
stand out. First, the multiple small communist splinter 
parties continue to show a surprising resilience, with 
several represented despite a series of recent splits. 
Secondly, the arrival of some ethnic/regional parties, 
in particular the Rashtriya Janamukti Party, indicates 
that identity politics exists beyond the Tarai. It may 
yet make itself felt more sharply, both at the national 
level and perhaps especially at the regional level as 
and when federalism is implemented. These parties 
 
 
51 RJP leader Surya Bahadur Thapa appeared to foresee this, 
cautioning before the election that “people aren’t happy with 
us [RJP, RPP, RPP-N] going separately – we can’t meet ex-
pectations” and preparing for a tough contest: “Elections are 
about winning and losing. I’ve lost before – it doesn’t scare 
me”. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 16 March 2008. 
52 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 4. 
53 “Raprapa nepaldvara ganatantra svikar”, Naya Patrika, 4 
June 2008. 
54 “Seven parties reluctant to accept the shift: Chandra Ba-
hadur Gurung”, People’s Review, 19 June 2008. 
55 The grouping of thirteen larger parties includes the NC, 
UML, CPN(M), Janamorcha Nepal, MJF, TMDP, Sadbha-
vana Party, CPN(ML), RPP, National People's Front, CPN 
(United), NWPP and NSP(A). 
56 See “Stop playing power games, 12 fringe parties tell big-
ger parties”, ekantipur.com, 6 June 2008. 
may also help focus attention on issues such as quotas 
and reservations – and keep up pressure on the old 
parties to reform themselves. 
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IV.  DIGESTING THE RESULTS 
A. KATHMANDU: THE BUBBLE  
THAT DIDN’T BURST 
By the morning of 12 April 2008, the potential for a 
Maoist victory was becoming clear. The Maoists had 
won five seats, with the UML and NC bagging only 
two and one respectively. The Maoists were leading 
in a further five Kathmandu seats and in over 40 con-
stituencies from which partial results were emerging – 
compared to around a dozen leads each for the NC 
and UML. By the time the Election Commission (EC) 
held a press conference later in the morning, the Mao-
ists were ahead in 56 of the 102 constituencies where 
counting was underway. Before nightfall, Prachanda 
had won from Kathmandu-10, and the CPN(M) had 26 
seats in the bag, including clean sweeps of Bardiya, 
Dang and Makwanpur districts. 
Endorsements from international observers continued 
(including from the Socialist International, of which the 
NC is a member), and parties and commentators were 
adjusting to the unexpected turn of events. Madhav 
Kumar Nepal resigned as UML general secretary and 
Sushil Koirala as NC acting president (although his 
resignation was rejected by party leader G.P. Koirala). 
Formerly hostile newspapers hailed the “Maoist wave”;57 
commentators on the staunchly royalist and anti-Maoist 
People’s Review fell over themselves to offer glowing 
encomiums. The press and airwaves were awash with 
mea culpas from analysts who had confidently predicted 
a crushing Maoist defeat. The Maoists themselves 
were quick to be magnanimous in victory, assuring 
the business community and international powers that 
they were keen to work in partnership. 
However, as the CPN(M) tally climbed higher, the 
graceful losers turned sour. On the sixth morning after 
the vote, former UML leader Nepal conceded defeat in 
the second constituency he had stood for. His party 
pulled out from the government and, despite Prachan-
da’s entreaty to Prime Minister Koirala to collaborate, 
NC leaders started publicly urging their party not to 
 
 
57 “Groundswell for Maoists” was the Kathmandu Post’s 
banner cover headline, 13 April 2008; its sister paper, Kanti-
pur, Nepal’s largest selling daily, had already hailed the 
“people’s wave” for the Maoists. “Maovadi pakshama janla-
har”, 12 April 2008. A rival newspaper described how the 
Maoists “continued with their winning streak … and scored 
several stunning upsets”. “Maoists poised for landslide win”, 
Himalayan Times, 13 April 2008. 
join a Maoist-led administration.58 Formerly hostile 
commentators, prompted in part by evidence of con-
tinued Maoist violence, moved to resume their former 
stance that the CPN(M) still had to pass further tests 
before it could prove itself worthy of power. 
The changed attitudes to the election results were the 
most notable feature of the return to a “normal” Kath-
mandu perspective. Losing party leaders who had ini-
tially accepted their defeat realised that the statistics 
could be reinterpreted to tell a different story. The 
Maoists had only won just over 30 per cent of the vote 
– and that too on a 60 per cent turnout. This meant 
that the “non-Maoists” could claim they represented 
almost 80 per cent of the population. In any case, NC 
and UML leaders started complaining more vocally 
that the Maoists had cheated and that any apparent 
victory was stolen.59 As parties and their supporters in 
the media tried to turn the clock back, they set new 
criteria for the Maoists to claim a place in govern-
ment.60 The critical difference of a popular mandate 
was put to one side, as the Maoists’ opponents resur-
rected the traditional tactics of appealing to higher 
powers instead of the electorate, focusing their efforts 
on New Delhi and other potential powerbrokers. 
B. INDIA: BIG BROTHER’S BITTER- 
SWEET TRIUMPH 
For India, the elections were a bitter-sweet triumph. 
They marked a resounding success for the peace 
process it had helped craft and an endorsement for the 
very public urging that they should take place. But the 
results looked to many like an embarrassing snub for 
the parties New Delhi had apparently backed and ex-
pected to emerge on top.61 Senior Indian officials 
welcomed developments and put a brave face on the 
unexpected outcome. In the words of prime ministe-
 
 
58 “Party shouldn’t join new govt: NC leaders”, ekantipur. 
com, 16 April 2008. 
59 See, for example, “Maoists’ threats affected free and fair 
polls, says Deuba”, ekantipur.com, 16 April 2008. 
60 The hostile media has not been entirely negative towards 
the Maoists. On the morning after the republic declaration, 
the Kathmandu Post’s front-page editorial was magnani-
mous: “The first and foremost credit for the republic goes to 
none other than the Maoists. Though the Post never agreed 
with the violent methods the Maoists adopted, it would be 
unjust not to recognise their role in bringing this day about”. 
“Republic at last!”, The Kathmandu Post, 29 May 2008. 
61 Most controversially, India’s National Security Adviser, 
M.K. Narayanan, used a pre-election television interview to 
underline New Delhi’s particular preference for the Nepali 
Congress. See Dhruba Adhikary, “A Maoist in Nepal’s Pal-
ace”, Asia Times, 19 April 2008. 
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rial special envoy and former ambassador to Nepal 
Shyam Saran: 
Several people in India have asked whether the 
government was not caught by surprise by the 
election results and whether these do not constitute 
a setback for India’s Nepal policy. I am surprised 
by these comments, not because we were not sur-
prised at the results but because people seem to 
think that our surprise was an unpleasant one. 
There seems to be an assumption that the Indian 
Government had a preferred electoral outcome and 
put its bets, much like a punter, on different horses. 
Let me make it clear. Throughout the peace proc-
ess in Nepal, India has not played favourites with 
this or that political party. Our stand has been that 
it is for the people of Nepal to deliver, through free 
and fair elections, their verdict on who should 
govern them and in what manner.62 
This frank assessment is not disingenuous: it is entirely 
in line with his and other diplomats’ public and pri-
vate comments since the start of the peace process.63 
“For the sake of Nepal we need an election. The result 
is immaterial”, outgoing Indian ambassador Shiv 
Shankar Mukherjee had observed before the poll. “In-
dia would like to see a democratic government, even 
if it is of the extreme left”.64 Nevertheless, New Delhi 
had great difficulty digesting the results.65 
India’s public responses to the new political reality 
have been measured and constructive, calling for re-
spect for the results and consensus on a Maoist-led 
coalition government.66 However, it appears to have 
lost none of its appetite for interventionist micro-
management and remains happy to shield the Nepal 
Army (NA) from democratic reform. It reacted calmly 
 
 
62 Shyam Saran, “Nepal’s Political Transformation and Fu-
ture of India-Nepal Relations”, keynote address to Seminar 
on Emerging Trends in India-Nepal Relations, Patna, 26 April 
2008, at www.meaindia.nic.in/speech/2008/04/26ss01.htm. 
63 Crisis Group interviews, passim. 
64 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 14 March 2008. 
65 Crisis Group interviews, Indian policymakers, retired offi-
cials and Nepal analysts, New Delhi, 18 April 2008. 
66 “Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh has called on 
the political parties of Nepal to forge consensus to deal with 
the major political issues. During a meeting with Nepalese 
ambassador Dr Durgesh Man Singh in New Delhi, Monday, 
the Indian prime minister expressed satisfaction over the way 
political issues have been sorted out in the country. ‘India is 
happy that Nepal’s parties are moving ahead constructively’, 
he is said to have told the Nepalese envoy. ‘The parties 
should make every effort to build an inclusive Nepal’, the 
envoy quoted the Indian PM as saying”. “Indian PM backs 
consensus in Nepal”, nepalnews.com, 10 June 2008. 
to the Maoists’ call to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship, which many Nepalis have long 
considered biased in India’s favour.67 Former ambas-
sadors have weighed in with supportive comments to 
urge a cool-headed approach to improving bilateral re-
lations. “Our role has to be people-centric rather than 
personalised and personality-centric, as has been the 
case in the past”, observed a former ambassador, Deb 
Mukharji, at a New Delhi policy seminar. “The Indian 
government should now deal with Nepal on a state-to-
state basis with greater transparency. This will im-
prove the relations between the two countries”.68 
India’s stance on Nepal has many domestic ramifica-
tions, as different constituencies have clearly perceived 
interests and positions. New Delhi’s willingness to 
engage the CPN(M) since mid-2005 and encourage it 
to enter open politics is particularly sensitive at a time 
when India’s Maoists are on the offensive. In Chhat-
tisgarh state, they have for the first time announced 
the establishment of a parallel “revolutionary govern-
ment”, a step similar to the CPN(M)’s establishment 
of its United Revolutionary People’s Council.69 They 
also appear to be following the CPN(M) lead in add-
ing an urban focus to their formerly rural-based 
movement, with one senior leader reportedly saying 
that “if we fail to build our movement in the cities, the 
revolution will remain a dream”.70 
The Maoist victory was welcomed by Indian leftists. 
The most important left party, the CPI(Marxist), 
which supports the governing United Progressive Al-
liance (UPA) coalition from outside government and 
has been closely involved in Nepal’s peace process, 
hailed the results as “a clear and unambiguous verdict 
against the monarchy and for the transition towards a 
democratic republic”. Noting the CPN(M)’s “impres-
 
 
67 The treaty implicitly restricts Nepal’s ability to import arms 
by stating that Nepal shall be free to do so but that “the proce-
dure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out 
by the two Governments acting in consultation” – a condition 
that reflects India’s tacit assumption that Nepal falls within 
its security umbrella. The full text of the treaty is at  
www.nepaldemocracy.org/documents/treaties_agreements/in
do-nepal_treaty_peace.htm. For a well informed Nepali take 
on India’s role see Manjushree Thapa, “India in its Nepali 
backyard”, openDemocracy, 2 May 2008, at www. 
opendemocracy.net/article/india_in_its_nepali_backyard_0. 
68 “Nepal at a critical juncture”, report of a seminar at the 
Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 17 May 2008, at 
www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/ 
report/ReportDetail.html?cmaid=14579&mmacmaid=14580. 
69 Sanjay Basak, “Maoists proclaim own ‘govt’”, The Asian 
Age, 31 May 2008. 
70 Sanjay Basak, “Maoist rebels begin urban push”, The Asian 
Age, 11 June 2008. 
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sive performance”, it urged the Indian government to 
“make it clear that it has nothing in common with the 
negative and hostile stand taken by USA, which de-
clared the Maoists to be a terrorist organisation”.71 In-
dian leftists have joined together to pressure the gov-
ernment to encourage formation of a Maoist-led 
administration.72 
The Hindu right, however, has been seething. The op-
position Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) railed that the 
government “has been derelict of its duties; violative 
of its oath of office to safeguard the country’s interests; 
and has abdicated its responsibility by outsourcing its 
foreign and security polices to the Communists”. 
While expressing “satisfaction” at Nepal’s elections, 
it underscored “the need for great restraint in the ut-
terances and conduct of the CPN(M) as they had only 
about a third of the popular vote and that, too, ob-
tained through intimidation”.73 The BJP’s concerns 
are stoked by its perception that Nepal’s politics can 
affect domestic and regional stability. As party leader 
L.K. Advani put it: 
Terrorism and religious extremism are being 
stoked by anti-India forces in our neighbourhood. 
And they are helped by a weak response from the 
government. A section of the youth is being misled 
by political ideologies that believe in violence and 
have a deep aversion towards our nation’s cultural 
and spiritual heritage. This can be seen from the 
spread of Naxalite groups over a large geographi-
cal area. The victory of Maoists in Nepal is a wor-
risome development for India.74 
Behind much of this rhetoric is a fear of China’s qui-
etly growing power. “In all development activities Delhi 
must be the first, last and ever-willing neighbour to 
help Nepal and to keep China out under any and every 
circumstance”, wrote a columnist for the Rashtriiya 
Swayamsevak Sangh mouthpiece, voicing the Hindutva 
right’s alarm. “For India to have an overly Sino-
 
 
71 Press statement, Communist Party of India (Marxist), 16 
April 2008. 
72 Gopal Khanal, “Dahallai pradhanmantri banauna dabab 
samiti”, Kantipur, 13 June 2008. Members of the group re-
portedly include CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yechury, Nationalist 
Congress general secretary D.P. Tripathi and CPI national 
secretary D. Raja, all of whom have long taken a personal 
interest in Nepal’s peace process. 
73 “Foreign Policy – National Security and UPA’s Disastrous 
Governance”, Bharatiya Janata Party National Executive, 
parliamentary deposition, 1-2 June 2008, at www.bjp. 
org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm. 
74 L.K. Advani, convocation address at the Gurukul Kangri 
Vishwavidyalaya, Hardwar, 7 June 2008, at www.bjp. 
org/Press/june_2008/june_0708_p.htm. 
friendly Pakistan as a neighbour is bad enough. We 
cannot afford to have a Hindu but newly-secularised 
Nepal to use China to embarrass India”.75 
Nevertheless, even the Hindutva fringe has a realistic 
streak. King Gyanendra’s most loyal supporter, the 
World Hindu Federation, announced that it was no 
longer royalist, since the king had accepted the peo-
ple’s verdict, and would now concentrate on fighting 
secularism instead.76 Prominent BJP ally and Bihar 
chief minister Nitish Kumar hailed the CA elections 
as a “turning point in Nepal’s history”, when he wel-
comed delegates to an Indo-Nepal seminar in his state 
capital. The thrust of his remarks was pragmatic, mu-
tual self-interest, making a determined push for Nepal 
to work with India on developing water resources: 
“Indo-Nepal cooperation is of paramount importance 
for the optimum utilisation of water and overall de-
velopment of the region”.77 
India’s close involvement in every aspect of Nepal’s 
politics shows no signs of diminution; nor does the 
scope of its influence appear to have been particularly 
harmed or boosted by the election.78 For all the out-
pourings of commentary and analysis, the future of Ne-
pal-India relations looks mainly like more of the same. 
C. THE OTHER INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS 
1. China 
Nepal’s other giant neighbour has always been less 
voluble and visible in its dealings with Nepal but is 
no less keen to secure its national interests. Long sus-
picious of the CPN(M) – and embarrassed by its use 
of the “Maoist” tag – China was quick to shift policy 
after the April 2006 people’s movement and step up 
engagement. Maoist spokesperson K.B. Mahara vis-
ited Beijing in the first week of June 2008 and re-
ported that he was encouraged by his meetings with 
government and party officials. However, this does 
 
 
75 M.V. Kamath, “Nepal’s tryst with destiny”, Organiser, 1 
June 2008 at www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules. 
php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=239&page=12. 
76 “Hindu group deserts king, but rejects secular state”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 4 June 2008. 
77 Nitish Kumar, inaugural speech to seminar on “Emerging 
Trends in India-Nepal Relations”, Patna, 26 April 2008, at 
www.meaindia.nic.in/speech/2008/05/01ss01.pdf. 
78 On India’s post-election diplomatic activities, including a 
run-down of Ambassador Rakesh Sood’s talks with key 
players, see Tilk Pathak, “Maovaditira dhalkiyo dilli”, Ne-
pal, 22 June 2008. The Indian embassy has rebutted media 
allegations that its envoy overstepped diplomatic norms. See 
letters, The Kathmandu Post, 20 June 2008. 
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not mean that China will rush to embrace the CPN(M) 
if this might upset its relations with other parties.79 
Ambassador Zheng Xianglin has been at pains to 
stress the continuity in China’s policy: 
China’s good-neighbourly and friendly policy to 
Nepal is consistent. As a good neighbour and 
friend of Nepal, we sincerely hope that Nepal con-
tinues to move forward with the peace process and 
enjoy political stability and economic progress. 
The Chinese Government adheres to the principle 
of non-interference into the internal affairs of other 
countries, and respects the choice made by Nepal-
ese people on its social system and development 
road in light of its own national conditions. We are 
ready to make joint efforts with Nepal to promote 
the bilateral friendly relations and cooperation.… 
China respects the choice of Nepalese people, and 
is willing to develop friendly relations with all po-
litical parties, including the CPN (Maoist).80 
The CPN(M) has taken a stridently pro-Beijing line in 
the face of Tibetan protests in Kathmandu. This is not 
exceptional: all major parties are scared to offend 
China, and pro-Beijing leftists like the UML have long 
made near identical statements. Prachanda is report-
edly keen to visit China, including Mao’s home vil-
lage for “inspiration”. He says that Mahara’s visit was 
laying the ground for a trip of his own and stresses 
that in international relations, ideology will “not be a 
barrier”.81 China continues to emphasise that it is for 
Nepal to choose its own political system and “devel-
opment path”, a message that was reportedly repeated 
by Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
international department, to Mahara in Beijing.82 
2. The United States 
The U.S. has maintained its strong support for politi-
cal pluralism while gradually building contacts with 
the Maoists. It welcomed both the elections and the 
republic declaration.83 Ex-President Carter criticised 
 
 
79 One commentator, generally sceptical of the CPN(M), 
warned that Mahara’s diplomacy had “backfired” and that 
Beijing was planning to invite a senior UML delegation rather 
than more Maoist leaders. Sushil Sharma, “Picture imper-
fect”, Spotlight, 13 June 2008. 
80 “Nepal, China trust and respect each other: Ambassador 
Zheng”, The Rising Nepal, 16 June 2008. 
81 “Nepal leader eager to visit China”, China News, 13 June 
2008, at www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/13/ 
content_6758302.htm  
82 “China says it respects Nepal’s choice of political system”, 
nepalnews.com, 3 June 2008. 
83 “United States Congratulates People of Nepal”, U.S. em-
bassy, Kathmandu, 11 April 2008. The U.S. welcomed “the 
the slow pace of Washington’s shift in perspective: 
“It’s been somewhat embarrassing to me and frustrat-
ing to see the United States refuse among all the other 
nations in the world, including the United Nations, to 
deal with the Maoists, when they did make major 
steps away from combat and away from subversion 
into an attempt at least to play an equal role in a po-
litical society”.84  
However, the U.S. has taken quiet steps to reorient its 
policy. Following informal contacts, U.S. Ambassador 
Nancy Powell held a first meeting with the Maoist lead-
ership on 1 May 2008. When Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Dr 
Evan A. Feigenbaum visited Nepal on 24-26 May, he 
met Prachanda and reportedly held a fruitful discus-
sion. Prachanda requested the U.S. to continue economic 
assistance and to support Maoist efforts to introduce a 
“new model of development”.85 In terms of democ-
racy promotion, the U.S.’s main policy priorities are 
clear: “consolidation of gains in the peace process, 
promotion of security sector reform and the rule of 
law, and strengthening democratic institutions”.86 
3. The United Nations 
Domestic commentary on the successful election has 
tended to refer to the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) 
only in terms of its widely expected imminent demise. 
This is neither fair nor constructive. UNMIN has 
given cause for some of the bad publicity it has gen-
erated – there is truth to the feeling that it is over-
staffed and resourced given the narrowness of its 
mandate. However, that mandate was the decision of 
Nepal’s political leaders, and UNMIN’s role in ena-
bling the elections to happen was critical. Beyond 
technical assistance, which many election officials 
privately praised,87 its work as a neutral referee has 
 
 
Constituent Assembly’s first step in defining a new, democ-
ratic Nepal with the declaration of a republic on May 28”, 
press statement, U.S. embassy, Kathmandu, 29 May 2008. 
84 “Nepal’s Maoists gain first seats”, BBC News, 12 April 2008. 
85 “U.S. official meets Prachanda”, ekantipur.com, 26 May 
2008. A Voice of America (VOA) editorial reflecting the 
views of the U.S. government quoted Feigenbaum as saying 
the decision to abolish the monarchy and form a Constituent 
Assembly was a “very historic leap for Nepal”. He added 
that the next government should reflect the will of the Nep-
alese people as expressed in the election. “Milestone for Ne-
pal”, VOA News, 9 June 2008. 
86 “Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports – 2008”, 
U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor, 23 May 2008, at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ 
afdr/2008/104861.htm. 
87 Crisis Group interviews, district election officers (DEOs) 
and other officials, various districts, March-April 2008. 
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kept a useful check on the political process, as well as 
enabling more coordinated international support. 
“UNMIN has on the whole been pretty helpful – and 
the establishment of OHCHR [the Nepal Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights] was even 
more useful and influential back then than UNMIN is 
now”, was a typical observation from a senior NC 
politician. “If Nepal does hold free, fair and credible 
elections, international actors should be thanked. But 
they’re too big – for the money that’s been spent, 
what have they achieved?”88 
Nepal’s government ministers and civil servants un-
derstandably bristle at any suggestion of undue exter-
nal pressure or interference but are not unappreciative 
of the UN contribution. As Foreign Secretary Gyan 
Chandra Acharya commented, “moral support from 
the international community has been helpful, but 
progress, modalities and speed must be set by the 
Nepalese people themselves, and outsiders should re-
spect the state structure that we do have”.89 This basic 
approach is likely to guide consideration of any con-
tinued UN role. While UNMIN prepares to wind 
down its operations in preparation for the 23 July 
2008 expiry of its Security Council mandate, there are 
some areas where its role is still needed and could not 
readily be filled by other bodies. Most critical is the 
monitoring of arms and armies. The basic problem 
that there is no easy exit for UNMIN until the issue of 
PLA integration has been resolved remains as true as 
ever (see below). Maoist leaders have always been 
privately keen to see some continued UN presence 
and have occasionally said so in public.90  
 
 
88 Crisis Group interview, NC leader, 12 March 2008. 
89 Crisis Group interview, 13 March 2008. 
90 “Bhattarai sees UNMIN’s role until NA-PLA integration”, 
nepalnews.com, 12 June 2008. 
V. TRANSITIONAL STEPS 
The post-election transition was contentious and pro-
longed. For this there were three main reasons: the in-
terim constitution was unclear or ambiguous in many 
of its transitional provisions, leaving room for dead-
lock; its entire approach was based on the assumption 
of seven-party consensus, a concept both exclusive 
and elusive; and the pre-election calculations of all 
parties other than the CPN(M) were predicated on a 
crushing Maoist defeat, and none were prepared to 
follow the rules they had written when assuming they 
would still be in charge. 
A. THE LAST-MINUTE REPUBLIC  
DECLARATION 
The interim constitution required the prime minister 
to summon the first sitting of the CA within 21 days 
of the declaration of final results.91 Although there was 
some uncertainty over how to define “final results”, 
there was eventual (unstated) consensus that it was 
not the 25 April EC final declaration but rather the 
point at which the parties’ selections for individuals 
to fill their PR seats were approved. This happened on 
8 May and the prime minister duly summoned the 
first sitting for 28 May, just within the deadline. 
In the end, the republic dawned well after dusk. As 
the scheduled time of 11am slipped past, party leaders 
were still locked in frantic negotiations over the form 
of the motion to be put to the CA and the shape of in-
terim state structures. The assembly finally convened 
after 9pm, and the result of the vote came in after 
11pm. The 26 nominated members were not yet in 
place, a minor point but symbolic of the continuing 
lack of consensus and respect for procedure.92 Only 
 
 
91 Interim Constitution, Art. 69(1). See Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., pp. 17, 20. 
92 There have been complaints that the parties seem to have 
forgotten their promise to use the 26 nominees to bring in 
ethnic groups unrepresented in the CA through election. 
“NEFIN [Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities] dis-
gruntled over parties’ sharing 26 CA seats”, nepalnews.com, 
27 May 2008. This had been written into the December 2007 
23-point agreement, which stated that “Amendments [to the 
interim constitution] shall be made such that the nominated 
26 people shall also include those indigenous Janajatis not 
represented through election”. Article 2, unofficial English 
translation, at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/ 
2007-12-24-23.Point.Agreement.SPA.ENG.pdf. After the par-
ties had nominated their winning PR candidates, NEFIN cal-
culated that twenty groups were still unrepresented. “Ethnic 
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one congratulatory message from abroad was read 
out, that of India’s parliament speaker, Somnath Chat-
terjee. The vote itself was overwhelming (460-4), but 
the procedure was bizarre, with an hour wasted in a 
Westminster-style division (with members trooping 
off into separate lobbies for “aye” and “nay”) and 
those opposed to the motion only allowed to register 
their objections once the vote had taken place, but be-
fore the result was announced.93 
The motion on the republic was short and simple.94 It 
ousted Gyanendra and confirmed that he and his fam-
ily would only enjoy the status of ordinary citizens. It 
declared that Narayanhiti Palace would be converted 
into a national museum, and Nepal would henceforth 
be known as a federal democratic republic. On other 
details, it was silent. The CA adopted interim proce-
dures and passed a further constitutional amendment 
paving the way for a ceremonial presidency but did 
not spell out additional details.95 
It was not clear how the king would react to his dis-
missal. As even one of his loyal adherents com-
mented, “most observers following the story – tragic 
to some, joyous to others – remained unsure about 
which way the cat would jump when the fateful hour 
was struck”.96 A commentator from the other side of 
the political spectrum expressed similar feelings: 
“There had been suspicions and apprehensions re-
garding the implementation of the constitutional pro-
vision. The doubt was valid, as some parties were not 
very willing to put an end to the monarchy”.97 Well-
sourced reports that have subsequently emerged sug-
gest that frantic negotiations to save some role for the 
king continued between the palace, the army and the 
prime minister till the last minute.98 
In the end, the king had little choice. Haggling over 
his future privileges and dragging his feet over return-
 
 
groups not represented in the CA”, http://nefin.org.np/ 
content/view/314/. 
93 For a good analysis of the procedural contempt this se-
quence of events suggested, see Shiva Gaule, “Vidhiko 
upeksha”, Kantipur, 1 June 2008. 
94 For the full text, see Appendix C below. 
95 “Samvidhansabha baithakko antarim karyavidhi, 2065” 
and “Nepalko anatrim samvidhan, 2063 ko chautho samshod-
han”, Parliament Secretariat, 29 May 2008. An unofficial 
translation of this amendment is at www.unmin.org.np/ 
downloads/keydocs/2008-05-28-Interim.Constitution.Fourth. 
Amendment.ENG.pdf. 
96 M.R. Josse, “The enigma of G. Shah’s ‘graceful’ exit”, 
People’s Review, 12 June 2008. 
97 Yuba Nath Lamsal, “Republic of Nepal: People Are Mas-
ters of Their Destiny”, The Rising Nepal, 4 June 2008. 
98 Sudheer Sharma, “Nabhaeko raktapat”, Nepal, 15 June 2008. 
ing the crown and sceptre, it looked as though Gy-
anendra might turn his exit into an embarrassingly 
petulant saga. His behaviour even prompted the 
West’s most ardently monarchist daily newspaper to 
urge him to go with grace.99 Press speculation, backed 
by comment from informed academics, suggested that 
the palace was home to important historical docu-
ments as well as other heritage items.100 Ironically, the 
only palace secret to receive belated confirmation was 
the continued hidden existence of King Tribhuvan’s 
former mistress, reputed to be Gyanendra’s grand-
mother. She, along with Gyanendra’s stepmother, will 
be allowed to continue residing in the palace grounds.  
Gyanendra himself departed for his country retreat 
(granted temporarily by the government) on 11 June. 
He held a farewell press conference, in which he reit-
erated the pain he felt at wrongful accusations of hav-
ing been involved in the June 2001 palace massacre, 
defended his efforts for the nation and pledged to 
abide by the people’s verdict and remain in the coun-
try playing a constructive role.101 His statement, de-
livered amid the hubbub of an excited crowd of jour-
nalists in no mood to respect the occasion, offered a 
bathetic end to the Shah dynasty’s rule. 
 
 
99 “Last month, Nepal was declared a republic, and as far as 
removing a royal family is concerned, it was all very civilised. 
The incoming government won power at the ballot box, rather 
than with violence, and (following a parliamentary vote) gave 
King Gyanendra two weeks to vacate his Kathmandu palace. 
What a shame the process is now turning sour. The govern-
ment is asking for the King’s crown (not his head). Gyanen-
dra, however, appears to be in a huff, and there are concerns that 
he will replace the crown’s diamonds with fake ones (if it is 
ever returned). The saga has the hallmarks of the worst di-
vorces, and it is an undignified end to the House of Shah (es-
tablished in 1769). We are believers in constitutional monar-
chy but, given that Nepal’s people have spoken, perhaps 
what is now required is an etiquette book on how deposed 
royals should bow out gracefully”. “King Gyanendra of Ne-
pal should go with grace”, Daily Telegraph, 10 June 2008, at 
www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/ 
2008/06/10/dl1003.xml. 
100 Some reports suggested palace staff had destroyed records 
(“Jalaie darbarka kagajpatra”, Naya Patrika, 1 June 2008), 
but this was denied. However, respected historians believe 
many historical documents and artefacts are in the palace’s 
keeping. See Balkrishna Basnet, “Narayanhitibhitra ke-ke 
chhan?”, Kantipur, 1 June 2008. 
101 An unofficial translation of the statement was published in 
the Himalayan Times, 12 June 2008. 
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B. THE NEW GOVERNMENT:  
CONSENSUS OR COMPETITION? 
Despite the interim constitution’s vagueness over 
transitional arrangements, the other post-election steps 
could have been straightforward.102 All major parties 
were publicly committed to continuing consensus – 
the UML most explicitly so, stating in its manifesto: 
the government “will be formed under the leadership 
of the largest party on the basis of proportional repre-
sentation”, implying that any party with sufficient seats 
could expect cabinet posts and should accept them.103 
The NC similarly stressed the need for extended 
Seven Party Alliance collaboration in the run-up to 
the election. Until it lost, it was happy to emphasise to 
all other parties that the CA polls were “not a matter 
of winning and losing”. Prime Minister Koirala em-
phasised that there should be a coalition government 
even if the NC were to win a majority and appealed to 
other parties to join in.104 He did not, of course, address 
the possibility of the NC trailing in a distant second. 
The weeks after the elections provided some grounds 
for optimism. Despite the sometimes bitter fights over 
next steps, inter-party talks did not break down entirely. 
The existing government – which remains in place 
until it resigns or a new one is formed – even man-
aged to take some sensible decisions, such as the con-
troversial, but unavoidable, raising of fuel prices on 9 
June. All parties showed a mixture of intransigence 
and flexibility, hallmarks of behaviour throughout the 
peace process which has hindered, but never entirely 
prevented, agreement. 
The major problem was that, as predicted, powerful 
losers were not ready to accept the results. The only 
surprise was that the losers in question were neither 
the Maoists (who won) nor the king (who lost but 
conceded defeat) but the NC and UML.105 Defeat 
paradoxically increased their sense of rightful owner-
ship of their privileged place in government. The NC 
in particular – happy to occupy all key ministries 
throughout the post-people’s movement period as 
 
 
102 The interim constitution’s provisions on the formation of 
a post-election government were far from specific. See Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
103 UML manifesto, p. 38. 
104 G.P. Koirala, address at NC manifesto launch, NC head-
quarters, Lalitpur, 13 March 2008. 
105 “The two major parties of the democratic era make the 
most credible-sounding commitments to abide by the results. 
Nevertheless, surprisingly poor showings could prompt either 
to complain about an unfair environment or technical irregu-
larities”. Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, 
op. cit., p. 18. 
well as the prime ministership and acting head of state 
– decided the time was ripe to rewrite the laws it had 
written when expecting victory. It saw no need to lose 
the game if it could change the rules instead. 
Debate then concentrated on two central issues. The 
first was the provision for government formation and 
removal. The interim constitution, following the con-
sensus model used through the pre-election period, 
demanded a two-thirds majority. Given that the 
CPN(M) commands more than one third of the CA, 
other parties feared that once it was in government, no 
one could remove it. The Maoists argued that unex-
pected results alone did not add up to a principled 
case to amend the constitution. They also feared that a 
simple-majority rule would encourage votes of no 
confidence designed to destabilise any government 
they led. On both points they were probably right; 
nevertheless, they offered a degree of flexibility. 
The second issue was that of the head of state. The 
non-Maoist parties felt that the Maoists’ share of the 
total vote (under one third) did not entitle them to 
claim both prime ministership and presidency.106 They 
also argued the Maoists could not take command of 
the army while still retaining their own PLA. Both 
were reasonable concerns, as was the Maoist’s worry 
that any head of state with residual powers, however 
ceremonial, could also undermine them, in extremis 
by taking command of the army or exercising emer-
gency powers. At an abstract level, this deadlock 
could have been easily resolved. However, it also in-
volved the question of who would fill the post. 
The CPN(M) had campaigned on a clear commitment 
to installing Prachanda as president, so could justly 
claim a popular mandate. The NC had no prior posi-
tion, but rather than wrong-footing the Maoists by 
proposing a talented alternative candidate, such as the 
former deputy speaker, Chitralekha Yadav, it was 
clear that Koirala had his own eyes on the post – even 
when he said he would not stoop to wearing the 
president’s “tattered clothes”.107 In a short address to 
 
 
106 The NC did not comment on how much mileage it had 
made out of its 36 per cent share of the vote in the 1999 elec-
tions which, delivering it an absolute majority of seats under 
the FPTP system, has been the justification for it remaining 
at the head of almost all governments since, with the inter-
ruption of two periods of royal rule. For past results, see 
www.election.gov.np/EN/prevelection.html. 
107 “Others talk of a position [the presidency]. For me any 
position is tattered clothes. They’re not for me to wear”. “Sa-
hakarya anivarya: pradhanmantri”, Kantipur, 9 June 2008. 
He went on to explain that “he would rather head a post that 
has power”. “Republic not any party’s victory: PM”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 9 June 2008. 
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the CA’s first sitting, he had told the assembly, “today 
my dream has come true” (magnanimously adding 
that others might also share his dream), before prom-
ising “I will take my leave from you now but not for-
ever – I will be with you to the end”.108 Indeed, he 
kept up a determined campaign to retain power until 
promising on 26 June that he would step down as 
soon as a president was in place to accept his formal 
resignation. 
The NC and UML supported their push to keep con-
trol over the process by setting conditions for cooper-
ating with the Maoists. Some were reasonable (asking 
the CPN(M) to live up to its former commitments); 
others were not.109 But the underlying case was clear: 
winning an election was not enough to make the Mao-
ists “eligible” to lead a government.110 Maoist sup-
porters understood this well enough: “The two parties 
that had dominated parliament under the monarchy 
are trying to corner the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) into accepting a situation in which they re-
tain control over key levers of the existing state”.111 
As the haggling went on, there was no progress on any 
front. The CA convened for the second time on 6 June 
but immediately re-adjourned to allow party leaders’ 
negotiations to continue. On 11 June, it still had noth-
ing to debate, and members of smaller parties com-
plained it was being treated as a rubber stamp. At its 
next meeting, on 18 June, it adjourned indefinitely for 
lack of any agenda. Further promised meetings have 
been repeatedly postponed. 
 
 
108 G.P. Koirala, address to the CA’s first sitting, Kathmandu, 
28 May 2008. 
109 The NC set seven preconditions for its support to a Maoist-
led government. These included: dissolution of the Maoist 
people’s liberation army (PLA), people’s courts, people’s gov-
ernment, semi-military structure of the Young Communist 
League (YCL), return of the property looted or captured by 
the Maoists, rehabilitation of people displaced and an end to 
intimidation, threats and extortion. NC seven points: press 
release, 12 May 2008. The NC’s central working committee 
had been meeting at the prime minister’s residence since 24 
April; this press release published its decisions. The UML 
made similar demands. The MJF also set conditions, primar-
ily that past agreements must be implemented, any interim 
constitutional amendments must reflect the deals done with 
Madhesis, and the Maoists must specify the form of federal 
units in the Madhes. “MPRF forwards preconditions for join-
ing Maoist-led govt”, The Kathmandu Post, 4 June 2008. 
110 “NC, UML to give Maoists 7 days to prove eligibility”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 4 June 2008. 
111 “Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal declared, Assem-
bly deadlocked”, A World To Win News Service, 2 June 
2008. 
VI. MOVING FORWARD 
A. THE HEART OF THE POWER STRUGGLE: 
CONTROLLING THE SECURITY SECTOR 
1. The problem 
The NC and UML were not just putting on an epic 
display of sour grapes. The Maoist victory had left 
them with no policy on the issue at the heart of the 
power struggle: the security sector. There has been no 
discussion on this critical topic, even as both the NA 
and the PLA remain at full strength – an unaffordable 
and inherently unstable situation. The May 2006 proc-
lamation of the restored parliament had called for the 
establishment of a new National Security Council and 
supporting secretariat, but this has not materialised in 
practice.112 There has been no effort to develop the 
defence ministry as anything more than an under-
staffed post-box for the army.113 There have been no 
meetings of the interim legislature’s “146 committee” 
that was set up under the terms of the Comprehensive 




112 The proclamation declared: “The existing provision regard-
ing the National Security Council has been repealed. There 
shall be a National Security Council under the chairmanship 
of the Prime Minister in order to control, use and mobilise 
the Nepalese Army”. House of Representatives proclamation, 
19 May 2006, Section 3.2, at www.nepalnews.com/ 
archive/2006/may/may19/hor_proclamation.php. 
113 There is a one-page description of the defence ministry’s pu-
tative duties available online. Its URL indicates clearly enough 
its subservience to the army it is supposed to control:  
www.nepalarmy.mil.np/mod.php?hdng=ministry of defence 
MOD&pg=1. 
114 The Special Committee for the Integration and Rehabilita-
tion of the Combatants of the Maoist Army (the “146 Com-
mittee”) specified in the CPA was finally established on 21 
May 2007 but only met once before in effect dissolving it-
self. The new National Security Council was established on 
22 August 2007 but exists only on paper. The government 
has taken no action on the CPA calls to prepare a “detailed 
action plan” for NA democratisation and resizing, including 
“tasks such as determining the right number of the Nepali 
Army, preparing the democratic structure reflecting the na-
tional and inclusive character and training them as per the 
democratic principles and values of the human rights”. CPA 
4.7. The foregoing sentences are reproduced with no sub-
stantive change from Crisis Group Briefing, Nepal: Peace 
Postponed¸op. cit., p. 9. Its words similarly paraphrased the 
same substance from Crisis Group Briefing, Nepal’s Fragile 
Peace Process, op. cit., p. 9. This is not out of laziness: there 
is simply nothing new to report. 
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The Maoists’ PLA is indeed, as its critics rightly aver, 
a private, politicised force under the control of a revo-
lutionary party. This is not a sustainable situation and 
can only be a bone of contention with other parties and 
a source of apprehension for those who have been on 
the receiving end of its military force. It is, however, 
subject to a chain of command and political discipline 
that is far more transparent and effective than that of 
the NA, which remains, in contrast, a largely autono-
mous force, and one keen to flex its political muscles.  
The only contact between the army and the govern-
ment has been irregular private meetings between 
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Rookmanagad Katwal 
and the prime minister. These are not subject to any 
civil service or cabinet scrutiny and have sometimes 
taken place one on one, without minutes. Their pat-
tern is, however, clear enough: the head of the gov-
ernment and head of the army have each sought to 
use, control, cajole and bully the other in the service 
of their own partisan interests. In general, COAS Kat-
wal has had the upper hand – the NA is, as the prime 
minister knows all too well, by far the most powerful 
state institution – but he has also been outmanoeu-
vred, in particular over the ending of the monarchy. 
The saddest irony of the peace process is that while 
the army was under palace control, there were at least 
checks and balances on its behaviour: for all his 
nominal superiority, the COAS could not do anything 
without clearance from the king’s Principal Military 
Secretary. The transfer of supreme command to the 
NC president meant even this rudimentary level of 
control was dispensed with. The NA has never been 
subject to less political control in its entire history, 
whether under Ranas or Shahs. 
The mainstream parties were not willing to discuss the 
future of the security sector for two reasons: they did 
not dare trespass on the army’s territory (and received 
sufficient warning that trespassers would, probably 
metaphorically, be shot);115 and they felt they had a 
viable plan – let the Maoists lose the election, and the 
issue would somehow go away without the need for a 
policy. Either the Maoists would be so weakened by 
their humiliating defeat that they would concede to 
whatever the “legitimate” forces dictated, or the PLA 
would simply drift out of the cantonments in frustra-
tion and leave the Maoist emperor to rue his naked-
ness. In any case, the Maoist defeat would probably 
lead to the retention of the monarchy, so the king 
 
 
115 See, for example, the mysterious list of “suggestions” 
anonymously sent to the parties but appearing to reflect the 
NA’s political priorities. “Yi ‘sujhav’ kaska holan?”, Budha-
bar, 18 June 2006. 
would still look after the army and save his subjects 
from the trouble. This was never the most well con-
sidered of policies, and it left no party in any position 
to cope with the consequences of a Maoist election 
victory. 
The powerful position of the Madhesi parties, which 
secured a commitment in the February 2008 eight-
point agreement to the group induction of Madhesis 
into the NA, makes the issue all the more compli-
cated. Most Madhesi leaders, including the MJF’s 
Upendra Yadav, are firmly opposed to integrating 
former PLA fighters into the NA and are determined 
to see their earlier deals implemented before allowing 
progress on other fronts. The NA, which indicated its 
refusal to accept the idea of group recruitment in the 
wake of the eight-point agreement, will also be fight-
ing on two fronts. 
2. Pot and kettle? 
On this most sensitive of topics, it is tempting to pre-
tend that saying “on the one hand, the NA … on the 
other hand, the PLA …” constitutes balanced report-
ing. But the reality itself is not so balanced. The Mao-
ist position on army integration has been consistent, 
compromising and repeatedly shared with the pub-
lic.116 It is not entirely palatable to all, and there is no 
reason that other parties should accept it wholesale.117 
It is an opening negotiating stance, which will need to 
 
 
116 Their stance has been frequently reported by the main-
stream media, for example: “On integration of the PLA into 
the Nepal Army, [Prachanda] said it would be done as per 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and not all personnel 
would be taken into the army. ‘Only those professionally fit 
and physically fit will join the army, while others can be 
mixed into police or a separate industrial security force can 
be created’”. “Prachanda Rejects NC, UML Pre-conditions 
to Join Govt”, The Himalayan Times, 19 May 2008. Maoist 
leaders have not always been entirely consistent. For exam-
ple, PLA Deputy Commander Barshaman Pun “Ananta” has 
suggested the PLA could remain as a separate government-
controlled security force rather than be integrated into the 
national army. “PLA to be separate security force: Pun”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 14 June 2008. 
117 The aspect of the Maoists’ security sector plans that 
should probably most alarm their opponents has been subject 
to no public discussion whatsoever. This is not the integra-
tion of some PLA fighters into a slimmed down national 
army (which at the size the Maoists propose would have lit-
tle hope of taking over the state even if it wanted to) but the 
Maoist proposal for compulsory military training for all 
adults, with regular refresher training until retirement. That 
this has been subject to no public debate probably reflects 
the fact that no commentators have bothered reading the 
many Maoist writings on the topic or feel the need to engage 
with them. 
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be revised during talks, as the CPN(M) is well aware. 
In the meantime, the CPN(M) has restated its com-
plaint that the state is responsible for not embracing 
the PLA and bringing it under its control, despite 
Maoist offers to put it under government command 
from the outset of the peace process.118 Commanders 
emphasise that the PLA could be brought under state 
control before integration.119 
But on the other side – what used to be the king’s 
side, then was called the “state’s” side (until the Mao-
ists emerged to lead the state), then could have been 
the mainstream parties’ side (if they had accepted 
their responsibility) and is now the NA’s privately-
owned side – there is no negotiating position. The NA 
cannot prepare for meaningful talks, because its lead-
ership cannot accept the need for change, however in-
cremental and democratic. In this it has been shielded 
by powerful allies, in particular India.120 
The NA, which speaks when and how it chooses, of-
fered no comment on the elections. The only public 
welcoming of the peaceful step forward came from its 
representative on the UNMIN-supported Joint Moni-
toring Coordination Committee (JMCC), Major Gen-
eral Shivaram Pradhan.121 The COAS, not normally 
shy, devoted his attentions to issuing internal army cir-
culars that attempted to rewrite the constitutional 
 
 
118 “Maovadi senako yogyatabare prashna uthainu anyaypurna”, 
Gorkhapatra, 17 June 2008. 
119 “Sabai sashastra shaktilai rajyako mathat rakhine”, Gork-
hapatra, 18 June 2008. 
120 India’s position is conditioned not by ill-will but by its 
own history. All Indian politicians, even those sympathetic 
to the Maoists, find it hard to stomach the idea of integrating 
PLA forces into the NA because India’s own army never ac-
cepted “freedom fighters” into its ranks after independence. 
This has a particular resonance for Indian leftists. The “free-
dom fighters” rejected by the Indian Army were primarily 
members of Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army, 
which had accepted German and Japanese backing during 
the Second World War – a move bitterly opposed by Indian 
communists, who preferred to suspend their nationalist 
movement and reject Gandhi’s Quit India movement in order 
to support the UK in the greater struggle against fascism. 
121 “Nepal Army Tuesday pledged to move ahead under the 
direction of the government elected through the people’s 
mandate. The army’s commitment comes at a time when the 
Maoists are certain to lead the future government. In a meet-
ing held today of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Com-
mittee (JMCC) comprising the Maoists, Nepal Army and 
United Nations, Nepal Army Brigadier General Shiva Ram 
Pradhan said that the Nepal Army will completely obey the 
directions of the next government”. “Nepal Army to obey 
future govt”, ekantipur.com, 15 April 2008. 
process and undermine the sovereignty of the CA.122 
He used the occasion of a celebration of 50 years’ 
contribution to peacekeeping operations to reiterate 
the NA’s red line: no integration of a single PLA 
member.123 (This is always phrased as “entry for any 
qualified individual who meets the standard criteria”, 
but one of those basic criteria is that no one with af-
filiation to a political party may be recruited, thereby 
barring any Maoist combatant.) Even a highly sympa-
thetic commentator described these remarks as “sheer 
chutzpah”.124 More fanatical supporters see the pro-
tection of NA autonomy as the primary goal of the 
nation, rather than that “in Nepal’s case, only the sur-
vival of a democracy can now guarantee the independ-
ence of the military”.125 In the meantime, international 
backers are held hostage to the threat that any meas-
ure of reform would weaken NA morale and lead to a 
Maoist takeover – a ludicrous bluff, but one that Delhi 
and Washington have so far been too timid to call. 
3. A way out? 
There is hope for progress. Despite their apparent hos-
tility, the CPN(M) and the NA have held talks at dif-
ferent levels. This raises the prospect of agreement. It 
should also alarm anyone who believes in democratic 
control of the peace process and of the nation’s secu-
 
 
122 COAS’s circular, as quoted in Jana Aastha (“Senadvara 
dindinai anautho sarkular”, 11 June 2008): “He who benefits 
personally from a move to remove someone today will just 
as likely be himself removed in the next move” – obviously 
referring to Gyanendra but perhaps a hint at fears for his own 
position? 
123 The ceremony was marred by the UN’s principled deci-
sion not to attend, given that the venue (the NA’s dedicated 
UN peacekeeping training centre in Panchkhal) was where 
NA officers tortured, killed and buried the fifteen-year-old 
Maina Sunuwar in February 2004. The Supreme Court or-
dered a police investigation in September 2007, and on 31 
January 2008 a charge sheet naming four accused was sub-
mitted to the Kabhre district court, which summoned the ac-
cused to appear before it. On the fourth anniversary of the 
murder, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise 
Arbour called on the NA to cooperate fully with the slow-
moving investigation. Press release, Office of the High 
Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) Nepal, Kath-
mandu, 17 February 2008. See also press statement, Advo-
cacy Forum-Nepal, 17 February 2008. 
124 He was referring to Katwal’s proclamation that “The Ne-
pal Army will remain a key promoter and defender of demo-
cracy and could be the only centripetal force for Nepal. This 
is why we strongly believe that in the name of democratisa-
tion, the Army’s purity, sanctity and integrity should never 
be compromised”. M.R. Josse, “PLA integration: tough nut 
to crack”, People’s Review, 19 June 2008. 
125 Siddhartha Thapa, “To realise the peaceful middle way”, 
Newsfront, 16 June 2008. 
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rity forces. Backroom deals between two armed forces 
whose commitment to democracy remains in doubt 
would be the saddest indictment of the mainstream 
parties’ abdication of responsibility during the peace 
process. 
The first steps for a viable and accountable process 
are still eminently possible and painless. They involve 
starting structured discussions between the parties on 
the shape of future arrangements, ensuring the cur-
rently well observed ceasefire remains in place and 
taking small, practical steps to build the infrastructure 
for civilian control of any future security sector – 
starting with staffing and resourcing a defence minis-
try and establishing a National Security Council with 
representation of all major parties and secretariat sup-
port that builds NA confidence and draws on its ex-
perience in making plans. None of this is rocket sci-
ence, and all of it is manageable. 
Where the NA and PLA have been forced to work to-
gether (on the JMCC), they have cooperated amicably 
and effectively.126 In private, senior NA officers are 
mostly sanguine about the prospect of incorporating 
Maoist fighters in the lowest ranks but do not believe 
their commanders deserve to be parachuted into sen-
ior positions.127 (Even the NA’s foreign supporters 
would probably see no difficulty in a few thousand 
PLA members being absorbed one by one into the 
NA.128) Junior to mid-ranking officers interviewed by 
Crisis Group were universally happy that the army 
did not have to intervene in the elections and were 
almost all concerned that their chief was playing poli-
tics with their institution.129 The fact that the CPN(M) 
received almost 200 votes from soldiers in the NA 
 
 
126 The JMCC has met 75 times and has functioned excel-
lently. Crisis Group interviews, NA and PLA representatives 
on JMCC, 18 June 2008. It remains “the best example of a 
functional body established by the peace process”, Crisis 
Group Briefing, Nepal: Peace Postponed, op. cit., p. 9. 
127 Crisis Group interviews, various locations, January-April 
2008. Two brigadier-generals separately and without prompting 
used almost the same words when pointing out that they had 
to serve, and complete higher qualifications, for three decades 
to reach their current rank. Both – one unabashedly royalist, 
one entirely comfortable with republicanism – saw this as the 
main problem if they were expected to let “an Ananta or a 
Pasang” [young but experienced PLA deputy commanders] 
be admitted to the national army at a similar level. In fact, the 
CPN(M) has held senior officers Baldev and Pasang in re-
serve, prompting widespread assumptions they are being lined 
up to enter the upper ranks of any restructured national army. 
128 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, March 2008. 
129 Crisis interviews, various locations, April-May 2008. 
headquarters itself suggests that former battlefield op-
ponents are not necessarily enemies for life.130 
Both forces have been insulated from more public 
criticism partly out of fear and partly because soldier-
ing has long been viewed as an honourable profession. 
Given the poor prospects for an effective Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission or individual war crimes 
prosecutions, a vetting mechanism built into any inte-
gration process could improve both the PLA’s and the 
NA’s public reputation.131 Most Nepalis would like to 
have an army that works for their security and that 
they can respect wholeheartedly. The joined forces – 
suitably downsized, more representative of all com-
munities and subject to democratic control – could be 
a great national asset. For now, they are a heavy drain 
on short resources and a constant threat to peace. 
B. PEACE, GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTION WRITING 
The success of the elections should not distract from 
the many remaining challenges. There has been little 
progress on numerous critical elements of the peace 
process. Apart from the security sector, the majority 
of issues the December 2007 23-point agreement 
promised to address remain unresolved. There is no 
mechanism to deal with contentious land issues (both 
the return of land seized during the conflict and the 
wider question of equitable land reform); nor has 
there been any consensus on reviving local govern-
ment, without which basic services cannot be deliv-
ered.132 While the Maoists have dragged their feet on 
dismantling parallel structures (such as courts and po-
licing), little effort has gone into making sure the state 
 
 
130 The breakdown of (PR) votes from an army polling station 
should not have been made public. The figures emerged be-
cause the NA’s Bhadrakali HQ was included in the small 
electronic voting pilot project, and the results of its polling 
emerged separately, before any other PR ballots had been 
counted. 
131 Crisis Group interview, human rights lawyer, Kathmandu, 
18 June 2008. 
132 “Minister for Local Development Dev Gurung has 
stressed constituting a local body mechanism with the repre-
sentation of every political party by taking the verdict of the 
people as per the results of the Constituent Assembly elec-
tion as the basis… he said the local bodies should be em-
powered and [vested] with more authority. He underlined the 
need for giving the responsibility of selection, formulation 
and implementation of development projects … to the local 
bodies and provisions should be made in which the govern-
ment will provide a lump sum grant to the local bodies”. 
“Gurung calls for local body mechanism”, The Rising Nepal, 
4 June 2008. 
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bodies meant to perform those functions can regain 
public trust.133 There is considerable demand for YCL 
services even from the Kathmandu middle classes, 
which have long since lost faith in the police and find 
its law enforcement prompt and efficient, however 
rough and illegitimate.134 
While the ceasefire has held, the state of public secu-
rity and rule of law is tenuous. Impunity reigns for all 
powerful actors.135 There have been no prosecutions 
for perpetrators of the worst crimes carried out during 
the conflict, and investigations on some egregious 
violations have been stalled.136 The whereabouts of 
hundreds of people disappeared during the conflict, 
most of them allegedly at the hands of the state secu-
rity forces, remains undisclosed, despite a clear com-
mitment in the November 2006 CPA.137 While many 
of the thousands injured in the April 2006 people’s 
movement still await treatment and compensation, the 
home ministry, without explanation, reinstated the 
two senior police officers who had been identified by 
 
 
133 Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula has at least warned 
the Nepal Police that they will have to change in line with 
new developments, not least by preparing for the structural 
reforms that will come as and when federalism is imple-
mented, “Home Minister directs Nepal Police to accept 
change”, ekantipur.com, 7 June 2008. 
134 Crisis Group interviews, passim. To cite only one illustra-
tion, during the fuel shortages that have plagued Kathmandu 
for months, the YCL took charge of organising queues at 
petrol pumps and preventing the queue-jumping that had en-
raged those who waited patiently for hours while others 
pulled strings. Such activities have given the organisation a 
positive spin, even among people who reject much of its be-
haviour. 
135 “Both the government and the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) (CPN (M)) largely failed to implement human 
rights commitments in the Comprehensive Peace Accord 
(CPA), signed in November 2006. Elections were postponed 
twice. Measures to address impunity for past violations and 
abuses were grossly inadequate. Vulnerable groups, includ-
ing women and minorities, remained at risk of human rights 
abuses”. “Annual Report 2008”, Nepal section, Amnesty In-
ternational, at http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/asia-
pacific/nepal. 
136 For example, there has been no progress in investigating 
either the illegal detention, torture and disappearances from 
the army’s Maharajgunj barracks in 2003-2004, or the Mao-
ist bombing of a civilian bus at Madi, Chitwan on 6 June 
2005, killing 38. For an overview of many abuses still await-
ing investigation see “Human Rights In Nepal One Year Af-
ter The Comprehensive Peace Agreement”, OHCHR-Nepal, 
Kathmandu, December 2007. 
137 “Both sides agree to make public within 60 days of the 
signing of the agreement the correct and full names and ad-
dresses of the people who ‘disappeared’ or were killed dur-
ing the conflict and convey such details to the family mem-
bers”. CPA, Art. 5.2.3, 21 November 2006. 
the Rayamajhi Commission as responsible for the use 
of excessive force against demonstrators.138 Although 
armed militants carried out fewer attacks than they 
had threatened, many parts of the Tarai are experienc-
ing lawlessness, with locals at the prey of organised 
criminals and shadowy terrorist splinter groups.139 
The inclusiveness promised by the diverse new CA 
will only be delivered in practice if there is greater 
attention to implementing rhetorical commitments to 
ending former exclusive practices. Nepal’s hard-won 
status near the top of the league for women’s repre-
sentation in an elected national assembly will be en-
hanced if women members of the CA are able to ex-
ercise their duties fully – not only in the debating 
chamber but also as active members of all decision-
making bodies, including the informal party negotiat-
ing teams that often take crucial decisions. No women 
have so far been involved in any of the main talks, not 
even on the CPN(M) side, which has the highest pro-
portion of women CA members.  
There is still a good opportunity for Nepal to set a 
global example by heeding the recommendations of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the role of 
women in peace processes.140 At the same time, the 
main parties will lose credibility with ethnic and re-
gional activists if they do not work hard to implement 
fully the agreements with the United Democratic Mad-
hesi Front and the Federal Republican National Front 
that were reached in February and March 2008.141 
As for the constitutional process that the election was 
meant to herald, the signs remain unpromising. While 
the Maoists’ manifesto did at least include detailed 
constitutional proposals, no party has paid much at-
 
 
138 The NHRC complained and asked the government to ex-
plain. The two officers are Assistant Inspector Generals 
Krishna Basnet and Rup Sagar Moktan. “NHRC questions 
AIGs’ reinstatement”, ekantipur.com, 26 May 2008. Many 
saw their singling out for criticism as unfair, especially as no 
one from the army, which was in overall control of the secu-
rity forces under the then unified command system, was sus-
pended or otherwise punished. See Crisis Group Asia Report 
Nº126, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, 15 De-
cember 2006, p. 28. 
139 For example, a 14 June 2008 Rautahat bombing, killing 
two and injuring many more, was claimed by the “Tarai 
Army”, a group whose structure and political agenda, if any, 
is not clear. 
140 The Security Council’s Resolution on Women, Peace and 
Security was unanimously adopted in October 2000. It de-
mands that women be included in peace negotiations, post-
conflict governance, humanitarian response and post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
141 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, 
op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
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tention to making the CA a functional body. Former 
Prime Minister Koirala made it clear he saw the con-
stitution-writing business as personal, announcing “I 
have one more responsibility: to draft a new constitu-
tion. I will need support and cooperation from all sec-
tors … while drafting the constitution”.142 He also 
launched his own search for favoured candidates to 
head a “constitution drafting committee” that featured 
nowhere in any agreements and implied no respect for 
the CA’s mandate.143 Where the Maoists have well de-
veloped – and controversial – plans for the shape of a 
federal state, the NC and UML have signed up to the 
concept without any effort to develop alternative pro-
posals.144  
Steps towards making the CA more inclusive have 
been bold and superficially successful, but using the 
constitutional process to institutionalise rights and 
opportunities for marginalised communities will be 
delicate and difficult.145 In all these areas, a commit-
ment to ongoing public consultation and participation 
would help to generate constructive debate and head 
off the sense of exclusion that has so often led to vio-
lent protest. But there are, as yet, no plans to trouble 
the public with political questions now that it has 
done its duty by voting on 10 April. These are areas 
in which donors could assist, although efforts will 
only be successful if they respect and draw on the 
large pool of talented Nepali constitutional experts, as 
well as individual CA members and party leaders.  
 
 
142 “New Constitution will be drafted under my leadership, 
says PM Koirala”, ekantipur.com, 17 May 2008. 
143 “PM Koirala looking for individual to lead statute drafting 
committee”, nepalnews.com, 3 June 2008. The names he had 
proposed (former UML general secretary Madhav Kumar 
Nepal, former chief justice Biswanath Upadhyaya, former 
law minister Nilamber Acharya and former NC speaker Da-
man Nath Dhungana) were all intimately linked to the failed 
1990 constitution, most of them as members of the drafting 
committee. Not entirely coincidentally, they are all of the 
same gender and caste as Koirala himself. 
144 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Election and Beyond, op. 
cit., p. 3. At the party’s manifesto launch (Lalitpur, 13 March 
2008), NC campaign coordinator Prakash Sharan Mahat spoke 
of “people’s hearings” to form “scientific” plans for federal-
ism (an idea that features in the manifesto), but there are no 
signs these hold any interest for the NC’s top leadership. 
145 On the many challenges in securing Dalit rights, see “Re-
casting Justice: Securing Dalit Rights in Nepal’s New Con-
stitution”, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New 
York University School of Law, 2008, at www.chrgj.org/ 
projects/docs/recastingjustice.pdf. On the politics and com-
plex practicalities of implementing affirmative action reser-
vations, see Townsend Middleton and Sara Shneiderman, 
“Reservations, Federalism and the Politics of Recognition in 
Nepal”, Economic & Political Weekly, 10 May 2008. 
The challenges Nepal faces in constitutional design 
may be analogous to those of other countries, but the 
peace process has demonstrated that transplanted so-
lutions and international expertise, however well in-
tentioned, are unlikely to be helpful. Technical assis-
tance to drafting committees and specialised sub-
committees (should the CA choose to establish such 
bodies, something it has not yet debated or decided) 
would probably offer the best entry point. Financial 
assistance could support broader exercises in public 
consultation – but again, only if the CA opts to en-
gage in such efforts. 
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The aftermath of the election has been marred by the 
behaviour of powerful losers. In a reversal of the nor-
mal grieving process, the NC and UML’s initial ac-
ceptance has given way to stronger denial. Both they 
and the leaders of other parties have been happy to see 
power quickly returned to its usual locus – in the hands 
of a few men who will take all major decisions based 
on private horse-trading, without consulting their own 
parties, let alone the elected CA or the people at large. 
For some, the rapid return to politics as usual may be 
reassuring. Back-room haggling is, after all, better than 
armed warfare. For a prime minister and party still in 
office nearly three months after a crushing election 
defeat, life must seem surprisingly sweet. But parties 
who pride themselves on blocking the Maoists’ as-
cendancy should be aware that they are also dishon-
ouring a clear popular mandate. For the CPN(M), the 
jury is still out on whether its peaceful revolution 
strategy will mark an ideological triumph, and it have 
much to do to win trust through reformed behaviour. 
But a peaceful revolution is precisely what millions of 
Nepalis have been demanding for years, if not dec-
ades. As the CA elections showed, they are perfectly 
capable of using non-violent protest and the ballot 
box to punish those who betray their aspirations. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 3 July 2008 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
CA Constituent Assembly 
COAS Chief of Army Staff 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CPI(Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
CPI(Marxist) Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
CPN(ML) Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) 
CPN(United) Communist Party of Nepal (United) 
DEO District Election Officer 
EC Election Commission 
FPTP First Past the Post 
JMCC Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee 
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (sometimes referred to in other sources as the Madhesi People’s 
Rights Forum, MPRF) 
NA Nepal Army 
NC Nepali Congress 
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
NEFIN Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities 
NHRC National Human Rights Commission 
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist) 
PR Proportional Representation 
RJP Rashtriya Janashakti Party 
RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
RPP(N) Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal) 
TMDP Tarai Madhes Democratic Party 
UDMF United Democratic Madhesi Front 
ULF United Left Front 
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UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 
UPA United Progressive Alliance  
YCL Young Communist League 
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THE REPUBLIC DECLARATION 
 
From the Government of Nepal 
Cabinet of Ministers 
Proposal on the implementation of a republic, tabled at the first meeting of  
the Constituent Assembly 
 
Respecting the historic revolution and struggles of the Nepali people, and honouring the peoples’ mandate as 
expressed by the Jana Andolan [of 2006], in order to institutionalise the achievements of the agreement reached be-
tween the political parties, and by embracing the responsibilities entrusted by history in accordance with Article 
159 (2) of the interim constitution of Nepal 2063 [2007], the Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Nepal 
hereby presents the following proposal for the implementation of a republic, during this first meeting of the Con-
stituent Assembly:  
1) This first meeting of the Constituent Assembly declares that an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular 
and inclusive Nepal has been formally transformed into a federal democratic republic from this day on-
wards, by vesting sovereignty and inherent powers in the Nepali people. 
 
2) Since a formal democratic republic has been implemented in the country, all constitutional provisions, and 
legal and administrative arrangements that stand in contradiction to a democratic republic shall be consid-
ered null and void, with effect from this day. Those rights, privileges, entitlements and titles based on the 
then-prevalent laws, customs, and social and cultural norms enjoyed by the then-king and his family prior 
to the ratification of this declaration shall automatically come to an end.  
 
3) At a time when Nepal has been formally declared a federal democratic republic, this amendment bill is be-
ing presented in order to make necessary amendments in the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 [2007], in 
order to constitutionally institutionalise urgent provisions, including those with regards to the [position of 
the] president. An additional amendment bill will be presented regarding the election of the president and 
other necessary issues. 
 
4) On this historic occasion, a new era has begun with Nepal’s formal [declaration of] becoming a federal 
democratic republic. This meeting expresses its deepest condolences to the martyrs, both known and un-
known. We cordially congratulate the entire Nepali populace on this occasion. This meeting appeals to all 
Nepalis, living in and outside the country, to celebrate Republic Day every year from now onwards on 28 
May (Jeth 15) in a grand manner and in a festive atmosphere. 
 
5) Now that the democratic republic has been established, the Government of Nepal will make necessary pro-
visions to convert the Narayanhiti Palace premises into a historical museum, and to utilise it for the welfare 
of the nation. 
 
Signed: Krishna Prasad Sitaula, 28 May 2008 (2065 Jeth 15) 
Unofficial translation provided by UNMIN. 
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ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 
 
 
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with 
some 135 staff members on five continents, working 
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to 
prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of 
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct reg-
ular update on the state of play in all the most significant 
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign min-
istries and international organisations and made available 
simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis 
Group works closely with governments and those who in-
fluence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis 
analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of 
senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is 
co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for 
External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief 
Executive since January 2000 has been former Austral-
ian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based 
as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The 
organisation currently operates eleven regional offices 
(in Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, 
Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local 
field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, 
Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, 
Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, 
Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Tehran). Crisis Group current-
ly covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict 
across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/ 
Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia and 
Turkey; in the Middle East, the whole region from North 
Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest 
of the Andean region and Haiti. 
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol-
lowing governmental departments and agencies currently 
provide funding: Australian Agency for International De-
velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development 
Agency, Canadian International Development and Re-
search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Dan-
ish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign 
Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency 
for International Development, Royal Norwegian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Qatar, Swedish Ministry for For-
eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United King-
dom Department for International Development, United 
Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. 
Agency for International Development.  
Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, Fundación DARA Internacio-
nal, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, William 
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund, 
Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and 
Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, 
Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe 
Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust and VIVA Trust. 
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